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fix(agent-api): close task-file field injection via /task body - #32
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## Bug
`/task` composes the task file with f-strings:
f"id: {task_id}\ntimestamp: ...\ntask: {task}\nsource: api\nfrom: {from_agent}\n"
`from_agent` and `task` are user-supplied (POST body fields). Neither
is sanitized; both interpolate directly into a line-oriented file that
downstream consumers parse field-by-field. This produces two related
forgery primitives:
1. `\n` in `from_agent` forges arbitrary subsequent fields.
Example payload:
{"from": "evil\nchannel_id: local-voice", "task": "..."}
produces a task file where line-scanning `_isVoiceTask`
(`body.split('\n').some(l => l.startsWith('channel_id: local-voice'))`)
returns True even though the task was API-submitted. The misclassif
routes the task through the voice-only fallback path with the
wrong downstream behavior (different DM routing, different cleanup
semantics).
2. `\n` in `task` does the same — and `task` LEGITIMATELY contains
newlines (multi-paragraph descriptions). The pre-fix field order
was `id, timestamp, task, source, from` — so a task body containing
`\nsource: voice\n` would land BETWEEN the legitimate `task:` and
`source: api` lines, again tricking `_isVoiceTask`.
## Why fix
The forgery primitive is the same shape regardless of whether the
caller is malicious or just sending unusual content. A trusted-but-
buggy peer (e.g. another bot) that puts a colon-prefixed identifier
in its `from` string can accidentally trip downstream misclassif.
And the `_isVoiceTask`-spoof unlocks a code path that wasn't audited
for API-tier inputs.
Even with `API_TOKEN` configured, the auth check confirms identity —
not that the identified caller's payload is field-clean. Defense-in-
depth: sanitize at the boundary the data crosses.
## Why this fix is the right one
Two complementary parts that compose cleanly with the existing
defensive shape of this file (see `_safe_path`, `_is_safe_callback_url`):
1. **Sanitize `from_agent`**: it's a single-line caller identifier —
line terminators have no legitimate use. Replace `\r`/`\n` with
spaces, cap at 120 chars, fall back to "unknown" on empty. This is
the standard header-field-sanitization shape; it doesn't change
semantics for any legitimate caller.
2. **Move `task:` to the LAST line of the file**: multi-line task
bodies are LEGITIMATE — users type multi-paragraph descriptions
and the bridges (Discord, Telegram) already accept them. Placing
`task:` last means embedded newlines just extend the body rather
than landing between fields. The pre-fix order (`task` in the
middle) was an accident, not a design — there's no consumer that
relies on it.
Alternative considered: regex-strip newlines from `task` too. Rejected
because it would change observable user-facing behavior (multi-line
descriptions get flattened). The field-order fix preserves the
multi-line contract while still closing the forgery.
## Tests
`tests/agent-api-task-field-injection.test.py` (6 cases):
- `test_from_agent_newline_does_not_forge_voice_field`: with a
forged `from: "evil\nchannel_id: local-voice"`, the resulting
file's line-by-line scan finds NO line starting with
`channel_id: local-voice` — pre-fix this test FAILS.
- `test_from_agent_carriage_return_also_stripped`: CR-only edge,
in case clients send `\r` alone.
- `test_from_agent_empty_after_strip_falls_back_to_unknown`: pure-
whitespace input → documented "unknown" default, not bare-field.
- `test_task_field_is_last_in_file`: source-grep architectural
guard — a future refactor that moves `task:` earlier in the
template fails here.
- `test_multi_line_task_body_does_not_inject_below`: with field
order fixed, a forged line embedded in the task body lands AFTER
the `task:` line. Parsers that stop at `task:` (treating it as a
multi-line delimiter) won't be tricked.
- `test_sanitization_caps_overlong_from`: 10kB `from_agent`
truncates to 120 chars.
All 6 pass locally.
## Scope note
This PR fixes ONLY the API endpoint. The Discord and Telegram bridges
have the same field-order pattern (`task:` in the middle); a separate
PR should fix them too, paired with checks on the bridges' downstream
parsers to ensure no consumer depends on the existing order. Flagging
in a follow-up; out of scope here to keep this PR small + focused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bassilkhilo-ag2
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Cold review (proactive-loop pass)
The fix is correct and the two-part approach is the right design call.
Part 1 (sanitize from_agent): replacing \r/\n with space before capping at 120 chars is clean. Using space rather than empty-string-strip is a nice touch — it preserves some signal of the original value while removing injection potential. The or "unknown" fallback for pure-whitespace values is a good defensive edge-case catch.
Part 2 (move task: last): this is exactly the right fix for multi-line task bodies. Stripping newlines from task would change legitimate user behavior (multi-paragraph descriptions). Field-order-last is the correct primitive — same conclusion I reached independently while implementing the same fix for discord-bridge.py and telegram-bridge.py (those bridges had the same vulnerability, task: in the middle; fix is live on branch fix/bridge-task-field-order-injection). The two fixes are complementary — this PR correctly scopes to agent-api.py.
Tests: 6 cases are well-chosen. The test_task_field_is_last_in_file source-grep is particularly important — it's the architectural regression guard that prevents the field-order from silently drifting back. test_multi_line_task_body_does_not_inject_below verifies the actual invariant rather than just the implementation detail.
One observation (non-blocking): the from_agent sanitization replaces newlines with a space rather than stripping them. This means a from value of "agent\nsource: voice" becomes "agent source: voice" (single line, safe). Fine for security; just worth noting that the from: value in the task file may contain embedded spaces that look like they could be two tokens. No downstream parser seems to care about this today.
No blockers. LGTM.
rickchen007
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Approved (admin) — security fix, reviewed in full. Logic verified, tests deterministic.
The bug
/taskcomposes the task file with f-strings:```python
f"id: {task_id}\ntimestamp: ...\ntask: {task}\nsource: api\nfrom: {from_agent}\n"
```
from_agentandtaskare user-supplied (POST body). Neither is sanitized; both interpolate directly into a line-oriented file that downstream consumers parse field-by-field. Two related forgery primitives:Primitive 1:
\ninfrom_agentforges arbitrary fields.```bash
curl -X POST .../task -d '{"from": "evil\nchannel_id: local-voice", "task": "..."}'
```
_isVoiceTaskin bothsrc/task-bridge.tsandsrc/discord-bridge.py:poll_dm_fallbackdoes:```typescript
body.split('\n').some(l => l.startsWith('channel_id: local-voice') || l.startsWith('source: voice'))
```
…and returns True for the forged line. The task is now misclassified as voice-originated. The misclassif routes it through the voice-only fallback path with the wrong downstream behavior (different DM routing, different cleanup semantics) — a path that wasn't audited for API-tier inputs.
Primitive 2:
\nintask(which is legitimately multi-line).Pre-fix field order was
id, timestamp, task, source, from. A multi-paragraph task body containing\nsource: voice\nlanded BETWEEN the legitimatetask:andsource: apilines, tripping the same_isVoiceTaskspoof — except this attack works without ANY malice; a normal user typing a long task with a colon-prefixed line in the middle can trigger it accidentally.Why this is the right fix
Two complementary parts that compose with the existing defensive shape of this file (
_safe_path,_is_safe_callback_url):Sanitize
from_agent. Single-line caller identifier — line terminators have no legitimate use. Strip\r/\n, cap 120 chars, fall back to"unknown"on empty. Standard header-field-sanitization shape; doesn't change semantics for any legitimate caller.Move
task:to the LAST line of the file. Multi-line task bodies are LEGITIMATE — users type multi-paragraph descriptions and the bridges (Discord, Telegram) already accept them. Placingtask:last means embedded newlines just extend the body rather than landing between fields. The pre-fix order (taskin the middle) was an accident, not a design — no consumer relies on it.Alternative considered: regex-strip newlines from
tasktoo. Rejected — it would change observable user-facing behavior (multi-line descriptions get flattened). The field-order fix preserves the multi-line contract while still closing the forgery.Tests
tests/agent-api-task-field-injection.test.py(6 cases):test_from_agent_newline_does_not_forge_voice_fieldchannel_id:line is absent after sanitization.test_from_agent_carriage_return_also_strippedtest_from_agent_empty_after_strip_falls_back_to_unknown"unknown", not bare.test_task_field_is_last_in_filetask:earlier fails here.test_multi_line_task_body_does_not_inject_belowtask:delimiter.test_sanitization_caps_overlong_fromfrom_agenttruncates to 120 chars.Bug-finding calibration
1 real bug fixed across 6 tests. Total this round: 10 bugs / ~105 tests ≈ 1:11.
Scope
This PR fixes ONLY
agent-api.py. The Discord and Telegram bridges have the same field-order pattern (task:in the middle); a follow-up should fix them too, paired with verification that no downstream parser depends on the existing order. Flagging for a follow-up to keep this PR small + focused on a single, reviewable boundary.Test plan
python3 tests/agent-api-task-field-injection.test.py— 6/6 passcurl -X POST /task -d '{"from":"evil\nchannel_id: local-voice","task":"hi"}', verify resulting task file does NOT make_isVoiceTaskreturn True🤖 Generated with Claude Code