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Description
Adds coverage for the ADCS ESC11 attack path. ESC11 exploits Enterprise Certificate Authorities whose RPC endpoint does not enforce encryption, allowing attackers to relay coerced NTLM authentication and impersonate domain principals.
This PR implements:
EnterpriseCAproperties:RPCEncryptionEnforcedRPCEncryptionCollectedCoerceAndRelayNTLMToADCSRPCedge.CoerceAndRelayNTLMToADCSrequiresHasVulnerableEndpoint=true.CoerceAndRelayNTLMToADCSRPCrequiresRPCEncryptionEnforced=false.CoerceAndRelayNTLMToADCSis updated to use DCA as well.NTLM registry ingestion fix
This PR also fixes missing
CoerceAndRelayNTLMedges when SharpHound successfully collects NTLM registry data but Windows policies are not explicitly configured.When
NTLMRegistryData.Collected=true, ingestion now applies stable Windows defaults:RestrictOutboundNTLM=falseRestrictReceivingNTLMTraffic=falseClientAllowedNTLMServers=[]EnableSecuritySignatureis derived from whether the computer is a domain controllerResolves BED-6182
How Has This Been Tested?
Using this dataset:
20250611101235_BloodHound_esc11.zip
Screenshots (optional):
Types of changes
Checklist: