桔子数科事件整理/Juzi Digital Technology Incident
一、暴雷事件的开始
2026年5月至6月，中国互联网各大社交平台、投诉类平台开始大规模出现用户爆料。大量用户反馈，自己在桔子数科相关平台的网络借贷明明已经还款，但仍遭到资方强行划扣，且实时征信显示用户未还款。
目前互联网普遍了解的暴雷原因，是平台宣传并引导用户进行刷单，告知用户：
“短期免息借款，借完即还赚佣金，每单60-75元。”
用户在平台申请6000-8000元贷款，到账后转入桔子数科账户，代理随即发放佣金，APP同步显示账单结清。
不少人为了赚取佣金，可能刷了几十单。用户以为自己的每一笔借款均在第一时间全额还款，没有任何欠款。
但平台并未把这些资金给到实际出资的一众持牌消费金融及银行机构，反而对资金进行截留、挪用。而资方仍按照协议持续向借款人进行催收，并向征信系统报送逾期记录。
二、刷单还款可能只是冰山一角
以上是目前爆料出的信息。
用户一般只关心两个问题：
- 自己的征信是否会恢复；
- 借款合同是否能够确认已经履约。
然而，用户刷单涉及的金额可能只是冰山一角，很少有人继续深究其暴雷的根本原因，以及被截留的资金究竟去了哪里。
这背后其实是一场精心策划已久的庞氏骗局。
三、桔子数科旗下平台及关联公司
桔子数科旗下的马甲包括但不限于：
- 桔多多
- 桔小花
- 宜口袋
- 橙心贷
- 舟转金
等多款APP。
桔子数科旗下在全国拥有多家关联公司，例如：
- 桔子数科
- 欢聚畅合
- 慧聚科瀚
- 桔子轻舟
- 桔子互联
- 互联数智
- 数智轻舟
- 上海桔策
- 友信资产
其公司主体分布广泛。
营口是其名义上的总部所在地；北京和深圳主要负责研发与运营；上海负责风控；其他各地实体主要负责催收。
公司各个实体的法人及实控人主要包括：
- 史孝东
- 刘毅
- 曹洪亮
四、从桔子分期到桔多多
该公司长期打着助贷的名义，做着网络小额贷款的生意。
其前身是桔子分期。校园贷暴雷后被监管部门叫停，2017年摇身一变，更名为桔多多。
2025年10月新政之前，其贷款年化利率长期维持在36%，客户群体主要是银行不愿意做的高风险用户。
2025年10月新政之后，其大部分产品贷款年化利率下调至20%，但如此高的利率依旧亏损。
核心原因就是其用户群体风险过高，坏账率极高。贷款年化利率下调至20%后，已经不足以使其继续实现盈利。
五、2025年10月新政后的变化
2025年10月新政后，一场精心设计的变种庞氏骗局就此展开。
首先，桔子数科将慧聚科瀚进行了名义上的剥离与搬家，公司旗下多款APP的实控和借贷入口调整到了慧聚科瀚。
慧聚科瀚的核心产品宜口袋，在暴雷之前继续暗地里维持着36%的高额放贷利率。
与此同时，两件事情开始同步进行。
- 引导用户刷单并截留还款资金
一方面，平台开始进行前面提到的操作：
引导用户刷单，并截留用户的还款资金。
用户认为自己已经完成还款，APP也显示账单结清，但实际出资的持牌消费金融机构及银行并未收到相应资金。
- 制造“虚拟人”进行借贷
另一方面，慧聚科瀚控制的宜口袋开始利用已有数据，大量制造虚假借款人——“虚拟人”。
利用这些“虚拟人”的身份在平台进行借贷。
银行放款后，这部分资金同样被挪用或截流到指定账户。
至此，资金已经准备就绪。
接下来，就是这场骗局的收尾阶段。
六、海外放贷业务与资金转移
桔子数科在2025年秘密从外部采购、部署了一套海外小额放贷服务，主攻墨西哥等市场。
通过一段时间的经营，该业务收集了一定数量的海外用户信息。
到了2026年6月，慧聚科瀚旗下的宜口袋自建了海外墨西哥放贷业务，同时将此前外采海外放贷服务所收集到的用户数据，全部导入宜口袋海外平台中。
随后，利用此前相同的手段，再次大量制造海外“虚拟人”。
利用这些“虚拟人”从宜口袋海外平台进行海量借贷、刷单，资金就这样顺利地从中国转移到了海外。
七、暴雷后的相关人员情况
在暴雷发生时，刘毅、曹洪亮及其家属在中国早已失联。
史孝东跑回营口，由地方保护伞保护起来。
至此，一场精心策划的庞氏骗局完美收场。
八、员工欠薪、裁员及债务规模
截至2026年7月20日，桔子数科已经拖欠员工工资一个多月。
大部分员工已经被通知裁员，公司无法立即兑现任何裁员赔偿。
目前桔子数科：
共计负债270亿元以上。
同时：
保守估计转移到海外的资金达到100亿元以上。
九、目前情况
目前，桔子数科正在立案审查中。
在这场庞氏骗局背后，受害者包括：
- 民间借贷用户；
- 资方；
- 员工；
- 甚至包括曾经为其背书的营口政府。
这些主体最终都成为了受害者。
唯一的赢家，只有策划这场骗局的幕后。
- How the Crisis Began
Between May and June 2026, a large number of user reports began appearing across major Chinese social-media platforms and consumer-complaint websites.
Many users reported that loans they had taken out through platforms associated with Juzi Digital Technology (桔子数科) had already been repaid, yet the actual funding institutions continued to forcibly debit money from their accounts. At the same time, their real-time credit records continued to show that the loans remained unpaid.
Based on information currently circulating online, a widely discussed cause of the crisis was that the platforms had promoted and encouraged users to participate in commission-based transactions, telling them:
“Short-term interest-free loans. Borrow and repay immediately to earn a commission of RMB 60–75 per transaction.”
Users would apply for loans of approximately RMB 6,000–8,000 through the platform. After receiving the funds, they would transfer the money into accounts controlled or designated by Juzi Digital Technology. The agents would then immediately pay the users their commissions, while the app would simultaneously show that the corresponding loan had been fully settled.
Some users, seeking to earn more commissions, may have completed dozens of such transactions.
From the users’ perspective, every loan had been repaid immediately and in full, and they believed that they had no outstanding debt.
However, the platform did not transfer these funds to the licensed consumer-finance companies and banks that had actually funded the loans. Instead, the funds were withheld or misappropriated.
Meanwhile, the actual funding institutions continued collection activities in accordance with their loan agreements and reported the borrowers’ loans as overdue to China’s credit-reporting system.
- The Commission-Based Transactions May Be Only the Tip of the Iceberg
The above represents the information that has currently been exposed through user reports and other disclosures.
Most affected users are primarily concerned about two questions:
- Whether their personal credit records will eventually be restored or corrected;
- Whether their loan contracts will be recognized as having been fully performed and repaid.
However, the money involved in these commission-based transactions may represent only the tip of the iceberg.
Very few people have investigated further into the fundamental cause of the company’s collapse or asked where the intercepted funds ultimately went.
Behind all of this was, in fact, a long-planned and carefully orchestrated Ponzi scheme.
- Platforms and Affiliated Companies Under Juzi Digital Technology
Juzi Digital Technology has operated through multiple affiliated or proxy brands and apps, including but not limited to:
- Juduoduo (桔多多)
- Juxiaohua (桔小花)
- Yikoudai (宜口袋)
- Chengxindai (橙心贷)
- Zhouzhuanjin (舟转金)
as well as a number of other apps.
Juzi Digital Technology also has numerous affiliated companies across China, including:
- 桔子数科
- 欢聚畅合
- 慧聚科瀚
- 桔子轻舟
- 桔子互联
- 互联数智
- 数智轻舟
- 上海桔策
- 友信资产
Its corporate entities are widely distributed across different regions.
Yingkou (营口) serves as its nominal headquarters.
Beijing and Shenzhen are primarily responsible for research, development, and operations.
Shanghai is responsible for risk management.
Entities located in other regions are primarily responsible for debt collection.
The legal representatives and actual controllers of the various corporate entities mainly include:
- Shi Xiaodong (史孝东)
- Liu Yi (刘毅)
- Cao Hongliang (曹洪亮)
- From Juzi Fenqi to Juduoduo
For years, the company operated an online micro-lending business under the banner of being a loan-facilitation platform.
Its predecessor was Juzi Fenqi (桔子分期).
After China’s campus-loan sector experienced a major regulatory crackdown and Juzi Fenqi’s campus-lending business was halted by regulators, the business re-emerged in 2017 under the name Juduoduo (桔多多).
Before the new regulatory policy introduced in October 2025, the annualized interest rates on its loans had long remained at approximately 36%.
Its customer base consisted primarily of high-risk borrowers whom traditional banks were generally unwilling to serve.
Following the October 2025 regulatory changes, the annualized interest rates on most of its lending products were reduced to approximately 20%.
However, even at such a high interest rate, the business continued to suffer losses.
The fundamental reason was that its borrower population carried extremely high credit risk and consequently generated a very high bad-debt rate.
After annualized lending rates were reduced to approximately 20%, the resulting revenue was no longer sufficient for the company to remain profitable.
- What Changed After the October 2025 Regulatory Policy
Following the new regulatory policy introduced in October 2025, a carefully designed variant of a Ponzi scheme began to unfold.
First, Juzi Digital Technology nominally separated and relocated Huiju Kehan (慧聚科瀚).
The actual control and lending entry points of multiple apps under the group were subsequently transferred or adjusted to Huiju Kehan.
Huiju Kehan’s core product, Yikoudai (宜口袋), secretly continued maintaining annualized lending rates of approximately 36% before the crisis erupted.
At the same time, two operations began to take place in parallel.
5.1 Encouraging Users to Perform Commission-Based Transactions and Intercepting Repayments
On one side was the mechanism described earlier:
Users were encouraged to repeatedly borrow and repay loans for commissions, while their repayment funds were intercepted.
Users believed that they had successfully repaid their loans, and the app itself displayed the corresponding bills as fully settled.
However, the licensed consumer-finance institutions and banks that had actually provided the loan capital did not receive the corresponding repayment funds.
5.2 Creating “Virtual Persons” to Obtain Loans
On the other side, Yikoudai, controlled by Huiju Kehan, began using existing data to create large numbers of fake borrowers — referred to internally or descriptively as “virtual persons” (虚拟人).
The identities of these “virtual persons” were then used to obtain loans through the platform.
After banks disbursed the loans, these funds were likewise misappropriated or redirected into designated accounts.
At this point, the necessary funds had been accumulated.
The next stage was the final phase of the scheme.
- Overseas Lending Operations and Transfer of Funds
During 2025, Juzi Digital Technology secretly procured and deployed an overseas micro-lending service from an external provider, primarily targeting markets such as Mexico.
After operating the service for a period of time, it accumulated a certain amount of overseas user information.
By June 2026, Huiju Kehan’s Yikoudai had established its own overseas lending operation in Mexico.
At the same time, all user data collected through the previously outsourced overseas lending service was imported into Yikoudai’s overseas platform.
The same methods used previously were then applied again to create large numbers of overseas “virtual persons.”
These “virtual persons” were used to conduct massive volumes of borrowing and commission-based transactions through Yikoudai’s overseas lending platform.
Through this process, the funds were successfully transferred from China to overseas destinations.
- Whereabouts of Relevant Individuals After the Crisis
By the time the crisis erupted, Liu Yi, Cao Hongliang, and members of their families had already become unreachable in China.
Shi Xiaodong returned to Yingkou, where he was protected by a local protection network.
At this point, a carefully planned Ponzi scheme had reached its conclusion.
- Unpaid Salaries, Layoffs, and the Scale of Liabilities
As of July 20, 2026, Juzi Digital Technology had already failed to pay employee salaries for more than one month.
Most employees had been informed that they would be laid off, while the company was unable to immediately pay any of the required severance compensation.
Juzi Digital Technology’s total liabilities exceeded:
RMB 27 billion
Meanwhile, a conservative estimate of the amount transferred overseas exceeded:
RMB 10 billion
- Current Situation
At present, Juzi Digital Technology is under formal case review and investigation.
Behind this Ponzi scheme, the victims include:
- Individual borrowers;
- Funding institutions;
- Employees;
- And even the Yingkou government, which had previously provided support or endorsement to the company.
All of these parties ultimately became victims.
The only winners were those behind the planning and execution of the scheme.