feat: version 2 asset unlocks with stable txids and InstantSend locks (DIP-0027 amendment, v24) - #7639
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 4 included reviews per hour; 3 remain after this review. WalkthroughVersion 2 Asset Unlock transactions now use stable transaction IDs and separate instance hashes. The change updates validation, InstantSend lock inputs, mempool replacement, peer relay, mining, RPC output, and test coverage. Protocol version 70242 adds Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 5 (Critical) | ~90 minutes Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Peer
participant PeerManager
participant Mempool
participant InstantSend
participant Miner
Peer->>PeerManager: Announce MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK by instance hash
PeerManager->>Mempool: Request and accept transaction
Mempool->>InstantSend: Submit canonical lock input
InstantSend-->>Mempool: Record InstantSend lock
Miner->>Mempool: Select minable Asset Unlock
Miner->>Miner: Commit instance hashes in CbTx
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The Asset Unlock v2 changes have no identified merge-blocking risk. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Inline comments:
In `@src/evo/evodb.h`:
- Line 125: Update HasActiveTransaction() to return true only when called from
the thread that owns the active transaction; otherwise return false, while
preserving the existing active_transaction.has_value() behavior for the owning
thread.
In `@src/llmq/signing.cpp`:
- Line 552: Update TruncateRecoveredSig and both of its call sites to pass
deleteTimeKey=true when removing the recovered signature, ensuring the stale
rs_t entry is deleted while rs_h and rs_s are retained.
In `@src/test/evo_assetlocks_tests.cpp`:
- Around line 662-664: Strengthen the assertions after
ReplaceAssetUnlockInstance by verifying that unlock_v2 and unlock_v2_resigned
have different instance hashes, then retrieve the mempool transaction using its
stable transaction ID and assert its instance hash equals
unlock_v2_resigned->GetInstanceHash().
- Around line 507-511: Update the re-signing test cases in
src/test/evo_assetlocks_tests.cpp:507-511 and
src/test/evo_assetlocks_tests.cpp:635-638 to use non-empty, differing quorumSig
values. In the make_unlock_tx helper, verify that changing quorumSig preserves
the stable txid while changing the instance hash; in the Asset Unlock commitment
test, verify that changing quorumSig changes the commitment root.
In `@src/validation.cpp`:
- Line 1301: Update AcceptMultipleTransactions and AcceptPackage to apply the
same instance-hash and freshness handling used by TryAssetUnlockRefresh before
stable transaction ID rejection or de-duplication. Ensure a fresher Asset Unlock
instance is refreshed and accepted in both multi-transaction testmempoolaccept
and submitpackage flows, while preserving existing behavior for non-fresher
instances.
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📒 Files selected for processing (43)
doc/release-notes-7639.mdsrc/blockencodings.cppsrc/core_write.cppsrc/evo/assetlocktx.cppsrc/evo/assetlocktx.hsrc/evo/cbtx.cppsrc/evo/cbtx.hsrc/evo/core_write.cppsrc/evo/creditpool.cppsrc/evo/evodb.hsrc/evo/specialtxman.cppsrc/instantsend/db.cppsrc/instantsend/instantsend.cppsrc/instantsend/instantsend.hsrc/instantsend/lock.cppsrc/instantsend/lock.hsrc/instantsend/net_instantsend.cppsrc/instantsend/signing.cppsrc/instantsend/signing.hsrc/llmq/signing.cppsrc/llmq/signing_shares.cppsrc/net_processing.cppsrc/node/miner.cppsrc/node/transaction.cppsrc/primitives/transaction.cppsrc/primitives/transaction.hsrc/protocol.cppsrc/protocol.hsrc/rpc/json_help.cppsrc/rpc/mempool.cppsrc/rpc/quorums.cppsrc/rpc/rawtransaction.cppsrc/test/evo_assetlocks_tests.cppsrc/test/evo_islock_tests.cppsrc/test/util/setup_common.cppsrc/txmempool.cppsrc/txmempool.hsrc/validation.cppsrc/version.htest/functional/feature_asset_locks.pytest/functional/test_framework/messages.pytest/functional/test_framework/p2p.pytest/lint/lint-circular-dependencies.py
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Applied the validated review fixes in
The incremental build and targeted 🤖 Posted autonomously by Codex on behalf of pasta. |
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This pull request has conflicts, please rebase. |
… signing info zeroed Version 2 asset unlock payloads are serialized identically to version 1; the version byte, gated on DEPLOYMENT_V24, changes how the transaction is hashed: the txid excludes the trailing requestedHeight, quorumHash and quorumSig payload fields - exactly the fields Platform changes when it re-signs an expired withdrawal - so every re-signed instance of one withdrawal is the same transaction. Spends of its outputs reference that stable txid and stay valid across re-signs with no aliasing in the mempool, UTXO or wallet layers. The full-serialization hash remains available as GetInstanceHash() to distinguish the instances of one withdrawal for relay and for the coinbase commitment introduced in the next commit. The signed message is unchanged: it zeroes only quorumSig and must be computed from the full serialization, never via GetHash().
…se transaction Version 2 asset unlock txids exclude the quorum signing info, so the block merkle root no longer commits to those bytes. Coinbase transaction version 4, required once v24 activates, adds merkleRootAssetUnlocks: a merkle root over the instance hashes of the block's version 2 asset unlocks in block order, null when there are none. The root is verified in CheckMerkleRoot as a mutation check, mirroring segwit's witness commitment: a middleman can alter signing-info bytes without breaking the merkle root, and treating the mismatch as block invalidity would let it poison an honest block's hash. Compact block short IDs are computed from instance hashes (equal to the txid for every other transaction), so a mempool entry holding a different re-signed instance of a withdrawal is requested via getblocktxn instead of being spliced into the reconstructed block; the FillBlock mutation check backstops any remaining short ID collision.
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Rebased onto
Validation on the rebased tip (macOS arm64): full 🤖 Posted autonomously by Codex on behalf of pasta. |
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Local build is warning-free; 🤖 Posted autonomously by Codex on behalf of pasta. |
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Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)
All eight prior findings are fixed at the reviewed head. One blocking relay defect remains: recording a modern sender's stable txid prevents later refresh announcements from reaching that sender. The three commit-history suggestions are also supported by the reachable commit diffs; this verification used source and history inspection, without running tests.
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 3 suggestion(s)
3 finding(s) not shown inline (the lines are not part of this PR's diff)
🟡 Suggestion: Split and fold the unrelated review fixes
<commit:bcebc1a>:1
Commit bcebc1a combines independent changes to EvoDB transaction ownership, recovered-signature time-index cleanup, and mempool replacement test assertions. These repair different feature commits and do not form one atomic change. Fold each correction into the commit it amends, or split them into focused standalone commits, so the permanent history preserves independently understandable and revertible changes.
source: gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: dash-core-commit-history)
🟡 Suggestion: Fold the nowallet build fix into the InstantSend feature commit
<commit:f4d5522>:1
Commit 14a62ed adds calls to the new HasLockInputs and GetLockInputs helpers from sources built into libdashkernel, but does not add instantsend/lock.cpp to that target. Commit f4d5522 supplies only that missing source-list entry. Fold the entry into 14a62ed so the feature commit does not leave the nowallet build with unresolved helper symbols.
source: gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: dash-core-commit-history)
🟡 Suggestion: Squash the regression repair into the commits it corrects
<commit:71e13e2>:1
Commit 71e13e2 reverts the non-compiling relay change and unsafe package-test shortcut introduced by ab8e483, while also fixing InstantSend's stored refresh instance and adding tests. The reachable history consequently includes both an intermediate build failure and three unrelated repairs in one commit. Fold the relay and package corrections into the changes they repair, and place the tracker correction and its unit test with the InstantSend feature, preserving focused, buildable commit boundaries.
source: gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: dash-core-commit-history)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: dash-core-commit-history); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — This large, intricate diff changes consensus transaction hashing in src/primitives/transaction.cpp, coinbase asset-unlock commitments in src/evo/cbtx.cpp and src/validation.cpp, and InstantSend signature and withdrawal-lock handling in src/instantsend/signing.cpp, requiring coordinated correctness across activation, mempool refresh, and block reconstruction. - Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 13 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— dash-core-commit-history (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `src/net_processing.cpp`:
- [BLOCKING] src/net_processing.cpp:4885: Do not suppress refresh relay to modern Asset Unlock senders
This records the stable txid in the sender's known-inventory filter even when the sender supports MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK. For example, node A receives an old instance from modern peer B, then accepts a fresher instance from peer C or RPC. A calls _RelayTransaction with the stable txid, but PushInv rejects that inventory for B at its known-filter check before it can enter the transaction announcement queue. SendMessages therefore never gets the opportunity to convert it to the fresh instance hash. B can remain on an expired, unminable instance despite its neighbor holding the refresh. Restrict this additional txid insertion to peers below ASSET_UNLOCK_INV_VERSION; modern peers should retain instance-based deduplication. Add a regression test where a modern peer supplies the initial instance and subsequently receives the refresh announcement.
In `<commit:bcebc1a>`:
- [SUGGESTION] <commit:bcebc1a>:1: Split and fold the unrelated review fixes
Commit bcebc1aec8 combines independent changes to EvoDB transaction ownership, recovered-signature time-index cleanup, and mempool replacement test assertions. These repair different feature commits and do not form one atomic change. Fold each correction into the commit it amends, or split them into focused standalone commits, so the permanent history preserves independently understandable and revertible changes.
In `<commit:f4d5522>`:
- [SUGGESTION] <commit:f4d5522>:1: Fold the nowallet build fix into the InstantSend feature commit
Commit 14a62ed315 adds calls to the new HasLockInputs and GetLockInputs helpers from sources built into libdashkernel, but does not add instantsend/lock.cpp to that target. Commit f4d5522c54 supplies only that missing source-list entry. Fold the entry into 14a62ed315 so the feature commit does not leave the nowallet build with unresolved helper symbols.
In `<commit:71e13e2>`:
- [SUGGESTION] <commit:71e13e2>:1: Squash the regression repair into the commits it corrects
Commit 71e13e2756 reverts the non-compiling relay change and unsafe package-test shortcut introduced by ab8e483ed6, while also fixing InstantSend's stored refresh instance and adding tests. The reachable history consequently includes both an intermediate build failure and three unrelated repairs in one commit. Fold the relay and package corrections into the changes they repair, and place the tracker correction and its unit test with the InstantSend feature, preserving focused, buildable commit boundaries.
| AddKnownInv(*peer, relay_hash); | ||
| // Peers below ASSET_UNLOCK_INV_VERSION are announced the txid; record it too so the | ||
| // transaction is not echoed back to the peer it came from. | ||
| if (is_stable_unlock) AddKnownInv(*peer, txid); |
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🔴 Blocking: Do not suppress refresh relay to modern Asset Unlock senders
This records the stable txid in the sender's known-inventory filter even when the sender supports MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK. For example, node A receives an old instance from modern peer B, then accepts a fresher instance from peer C or RPC. A calls _RelayTransaction with the stable txid, but PushInv rejects that inventory for B at its known-filter check before it can enter the transaction announcement queue. SendMessages therefore never gets the opportunity to convert it to the fresh instance hash. B can remain on an expired, unminable instance despite its neighbor holding the refresh. Restrict this additional txid insertion to peers below ASSET_UNLOCK_INV_VERSION; modern peers should retain instance-based deduplication. Add a regression test where a modern peer supplies the initial instance and subsequently receives the refresh announcement.
| if (is_stable_unlock) AddKnownInv(*peer, txid); | |
| if (is_stable_unlock && pfrom.GetCommonVersion() < ASSET_UNLOCK_INV_VERSION) AddKnownInv(*peer, txid); |
source: gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general, dash-core-commit-history)
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Fixed in 991c9ffa1c: the txid is recorded in the known filter only for peers below ASSET_UNLOCK_INV_VERSION. feature_asset_locks.py now has a current-version peer supply the first instance and asserts the refresh is announced to it by instance hash.
🤖 Posted autonomously by Codex on behalf of pasta.
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Resolved (re-reviewed at 991c9ffa): The sender's stable txid is now recorded only below ASSET_UNLOCK_INV_VERSION, preserving instance-based deduplication for modern peers. The functional regression explicitly has a modern peer supply the initial instance and checks that it receives the refresh announcement.
… EvoDB transaction CCreditPoolManager::AddToCache persists a snapshot every 576th height via evoDb.WriteDerived. When a pool is constructed on a cold cache from a transaction-less context - mempool acceptance or block template creation right after startup - that write lands in an EvoDB transaction nobody commits and trips the clean-transaction assertion (evodb.cpp:99) at the next root commit, aborting the node at flush/shutdown. Skip the optional snapshot outside a block-scoped transaction; a skipped snapshot is simply reconstructed from an earlier one.
…d version 2 asset unlocks A re-signed instance of a pending withdrawal shares the mempool entry's txid; AcceptToMemoryPool routes it through a refresh path that fully validates the fresh instance and, when its requestedHeight is higher, swaps it into the existing entry in place - descendants, ancestry and fee accounting are untouched because everything the txid covers is identical. Stale or duplicate instances are rejected (assetunlock-stale-instance). BroadcastTransaction submits such refreshes instead of short-circuiting on the known txid. Version 2 unlocks are not expiry-evicted: an expired instance stays in the mempool awaiting its replacement so descendants never die with it, and the miner instead skips instances that are not currently minable.
Re-signed instances of one withdrawal share a txid, so txid-based announcement can never propagate a refresh: peers holding the stale instance see a known txid and don't fetch, and a rejected stale instance in the rejects filter would poison the fresh one. A new MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK inventory type (protocol 70242) announces these transactions by instance hash; getdata for it is answered with a plain tx message, requests and rejects are tracked per instance, and AlreadyHave consults the mempool's instance map. Peers on older protocol versions receive a plain MSG_TX announcement of the current instance and never see refreshes.
…ning with withdrawal re-signs Transaction JSON for version 2 asset unlocks gains instanceHash, the full-serialization hash distinguishing the re-signed instances that share one txid. platformsign allows signing a request id again with a different message hash, truncating the previously recovered signature so the new session is not short-circuited, and ProcessRecoveredSig lets a fresher recovered signature supersede the stored one for the platform quorum type. Platform legitimately re-signs one withdrawal (one request id) with changing message hashes - the message hash commits to the signing height and quorum - so the one-recovered-sig-per-id constraint must not pin the first signature forever. This also removes a narrow pre-existing race for EHF signals.
Pre-fork rejection; spending an unmined version 2 unlock by its stable txid; an in-place refresh by a fresher re-signed instance with the child untouched and the instanceHash rotating; MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK announcements observed for both the initial instance and the refresh; stale-instance rejection; survival of the expired instance and its child; flushing leftover withdrawals and clearing the window; and mining a fresh re-sign together with the child, asserting the CbTx version 4 commitment against the mined instance hash. sync_mempools() compares txid sets and is satisfied before a refresh (same txid) has propagated, so a sync_unlock_instance helper waits for every node to hold the exact instance. The test framework negotiates protocol 70242 to receive MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK invs.
The credit pool's withdrawal limit is enforced only when a block is connected, so an unlock that exceeds the day's remaining limit is indistinguishable in the mempool from one miners will include. The mempool now keeps the sum of the withdrawal amounts (outputs plus fee, the quantity the credit pool charges) of every asset unlock it holds, and a withdrawal-index map over them. When the pending total does not exceed the credit pool's current limit every pending withdrawal fits the next block; InstantSend uses this in the next commit to decide whether an unlock may be locked. The total is exposed as pendingassetunlocks in getmempoolinfo. Instances of one withdrawal signed under different versions have different txids but claim the same index, so mining any one of them evicts the others (removeAssetUnlockConflicts), including version 2 instances that are never expiry-evicted. Sanity checks in check() recompute both the total and the index map.
…ndex
A version 2 asset unlock is InstantSend-locked while unmined so that Platform-to-Core transfers become rapidly respendable through the ordinary machinery: spends of a locked withdrawal are plain InstantSend transactions, the wallet trusts its outputs via IsTxLockedByInstantSend, and the mempool's time-based expiry already spares locked transactions. The rev 3 CheckCanLock exception that let children of an unlocked unlock be locked is removed.
Unlocks have no inputs, so the lock pins one synthetic outpoint: {DIP-27 signing request id of the withdrawal index, 0} (instantsend::GetLockInputs). Every instance of one withdrawal, whatever its version or txid, maps to that outpoint, so a lock binds the index to one txid and any other claimant conflicts through the existing outpoint conflict handling; a re-signed instance shares the txid and leaves the lock intact. The islock wire format is unchanged. A peer's lock whose inputs are not the transaction's lock inputs is dropped once the transaction is known, since for an unlock it could otherwise poison conflict tracking of unrelated coins. Every vin.empty() early-out in InstantSend, including the IS-DB block hooks that mark locks mined and the block-connect conflict filter in validation, now goes through HasLockInputs so unlocks are tracked like other lockable transactions; mined unlocks are not locked retroactively since ChainLocks never wait for them.
Masternodes sign the lock only when the unlock is minable in the next block (CheckCanLockAssetUnlock): a stable-txid instance passing the full special-transaction check at the tip including its quorum signature, with no other instance of its withdrawal index in the mempool (a withdrawal signed as version 1 before v24 can be re-signed as version 2 after it under a different txid), and with the mempool's pending withdrawal total within the credit pool's current limit. Platform pools withdrawals under that same limit, so a pending total above it indicates a fault and nothing is signed until the window clears. Both the height window and the limit move with the tip, so every tracked unmined unlock is queued for another attempt on each connected block (RetryUnminedAssetUnlocks); a refresh re-triggers an attempt through TransactionAddedToMempool as well.
The DIP-27 request id prefix and the payload index accessor move to primitives/transaction.h so evo/assetlocktx and instantsend/lock share one definition.
feature_asset_locks.py now enables InstantSend for the version 2 phase and checks that an unlock is not locked while pending withdrawals exceed the limit (getmempoolinfo pendingassetunlocks, getassetunlockstatuses instantlock), that the wallet does not trust a child's output until the parent is locked, that a re-signed minable instance within the limit gets locked with the withdrawal index as its single input, and that the child is then locked through the ordinary path and trusted by the wallet. Adds the release note for version 2 asset unlocks.
Caching m_instance_hash on CTransaction grew every transaction by 32 bytes, and the mempool's DynamicMemoryUsage accounts for that: with -maxmempool=5 the pool now trimmed below the size mempool_limit.py fills it to, so the "evicted immediately after submission" headroom assertion failed on the --enable-debug -O0 CI job (100000 <= 136750) on every run of that job. The instance hash only differs from the txid for version 2 asset unlocks and is read on their relay, compact-block and coinbase-commitment paths, none of which are hot enough to justify a per-transaction cache. Compute it on demand for those transactions and return the txid for all others, restoring sizeof(CTransaction) to its previous value. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ts a cached pool Gating the disk snapshot on an active EvoDB transaction (0b345c0) dropped it for good whenever the snapshot-height pool was first constructed outside one: block template creation, mempool acceptance, getassetunlockstatuses and the InstantSend lock check all ask for the tip's pool, populate the LRU cache without a transaction, and the next block connection then hits the cache and never constructs the pool again. Every node mining or serving Platform lost the snapshot at every 576th height, and after a restart GetCreditPool walked back block by block to the V20 activation height. Write the snapshot from GetFromCache when a transaction-scoped lookup hits the cached pool, in addition to AddToCache. WriteDerived accepts an identical existing value, so a snapshot already on disk is a no-op. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…withdrawal index GetCreditPool throws on a block read failure, a duplicated index or an inconsistent pool, and nothing in AcceptToMemoryPool caught it: a peer relaying any asset unlock while the local block store is degraded escaped ATMP into message processing and the RPC dispatcher. Translate EvoDbInconsistencyError to an error state and any other failure to a TX_BAD_SPECIAL rejection, so the peer is not punished for a local fault. Admission also allowed two distinct unlocks claiming one withdrawal index to coexist (a version 1 instance signed before v24 activation and its version 2 re-sign after it, or a Platform fault); removeAssetUnlockConflicts only ran on the InstantSend-waiting path. CheckCanLockAssetUnlock refuses to lock an index with several claimants, so both stayed unlocked while inflating the pending withdrawal total. Reject a claimant whose requestedHeight does not exceed the held instance's before its quorum signature is verified, and let a fresher one evict the held claimant and its descendants in Finalize, mirroring the in-place refresh of a stable-txid instance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… credit pool failure CheckCanLockAssetUnlock runs on the InstantSend worker, whose TraceThread wrapper rethrows uncaught exceptions, so a GetCreditPool failure (block read, duplicated index, EvoDB inconsistency) terminated the masternode instead of refusing one lock. Catch it, log and refuse. An unlocked asset unlock leaving the mempool was never dropped from nonLockedTxs: TransactionIsRemoved returned early without an islock, and the conflict cleanup is keyed on spent outpoints an unlock does not have. The entry was re-queued by RetryUnminedAssetUnlocks on every connected block for the life of the node. Remove it from the removal hook. PrepareTxToRetry copied the retry set without draining it, so a still unlockable unlock had its quorum signature re-verified and the credit pool rebuilt every 100 ms. Whether an unlock can be locked changes only with the tip or a re-signed instance, and both re-queue it; hand it out once per trigger. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…them by txid too The stable-txid branch overwrote nInvType with MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK, so both downstream nInvType == MSG_DSTX checks were dead for a version 2 asset unlock wrapped in a dstx message: ValidateDSTX (masternode validity, rate limit, misbehaviour scoring) was skipped and the DSTX manager never recorded it. Key those branches on the message type instead. Only the instance hash went into the sender's known filter and the rejects filter. Peers below ASSET_UNLOCK_INV_VERSION announce and are announced the txid: the transaction was echoed straight back to the peer it came from, and a rejected instance was re-requested and its quorum signature re-verified on every announcement from such a peer. Record the txid as well; a fresher instance is still admitted since AlreadyHave never consults the txid for MSG_ASSET_UNLOCK. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The re-signing cases varied requestedHeight and quorumHash but left quorumSig empty, so a txid that still committed to the signature, or a commitment that ignored it, would have passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Pushed Blocking: refresh relay to modern senders. The stable txid is now recorded in the sender's known-inventory filter only for peers below Suggestions on commit history. Applied all three:
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Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)
Two blocking defects are confirmed at the reviewed head: a rejected signing instance can erase an existing withdrawal's InstantSend protection, and withdrawal-index eviction during package submission can abort the node. All 12 prior findings are addressed in the current source or rewritten history. Verification used source and commit-history inspection; no runtime-test result is claimed.
🔴 2 blocking
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: dash-core-commit-history); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — This is a large, intricate change that directly modifies consensus transaction hashing and coinbase commitments, cryptographic quorum-signature handling, InstantSend locking, mempool identity/refresh behavior, and peer-facing compact-block/network processing in files such as src/primitives/transaction.cpp, src/evo/cbtx.cpp, src/validation.cpp, and src/instantsend/signing.cpp. - Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 13 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— dash-core-commit-history (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `src/instantsend/instantsend.cpp`:
- [BLOCKING] src/instantsend/instantsend.cpp:131-145: Preserve withdrawal locks when rejecting another signing instance
TransactionIsRemoved is also called when peer transaction acceptance returns an invalid state (src/net_processing.cpp:5043–5048), even if nothing was removed from the mempool. A peer can copy a locked v2 withdrawal, lower requestedHeight without changing its stable txid, and send the previously unseen instance. AlreadyHave checks its instance hash, and TryAssetUnlockRefresh rejects it as assetunlock-stale-instance before signature verification. This callback then finds the genuine withdrawal's lock by the shared txid and calls RemoveConflictingLock, which removes and archives that lock and its chained children's locks while the transactions remain mempooled. If the withdrawal is not locked yet, the same rejection instead deletes its retry-tracking entry. Distinguish rejected signing instances from actual transaction removal, and add a P2P regression proving that stale or invalid instances cannot clear an existing withdrawal's locks or pending retries.
In `src/validation.cpp`:
- [BLOCKING] src/validation.cpp:1167-1172: Reject package index conflicts before removing validated parents
This eviction can remove a parent whose outputs another package workspace has already validated. For submitpackage([A, B, child]), let A be a mempooled v1 unlock, B a valid fresher v2 claimant of the same withdrawal index, and child a signed transaction spending outputs from both. If B meets minimum relay fee but is below the current mempool fee floor, individual admission leaves it for package-feerate processing. A is deduplicated, and B plus child pass PreChecks and PolicyScriptChecks while A is still present. SubmitPackage then finalizes B, removing A here. When it subsequently runs the child's ConsensusScriptChecks, CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache finds A's previously cached output in neither the mempool nor the chain UTXO set and trips assert(!coinFromUTXOSet.IsSpent()). CheckPackage only checks ordinary vin conflicts, so the two withdrawal claimants pass its conflict check. Reject conflicting withdrawal indexes across package parents, or account for all prospective evictions before validating package inputs. This is distinct from the explicitly deferred handling of same-txid refreshes in multi-transaction test acceptance.
| void CInstantSendManager::TransactionIsRemoved(const CTransactionRef& tx) | ||
| { | ||
| if (tx->vin.empty()) { | ||
| if (!instantsend::HasLockInputs(*tx)) { | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
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| instantsend::InstantSendLockPtr islock = GetInstantSendLockByTxid(tx->GetHash()); | ||
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| if (islock == nullptr) { | ||
| // An unlocked asset unlock leaving the mempool (evicted by another instance of its | ||
| // withdrawal index, expired, or trimmed) is gone for good under this txid. It has no | ||
| // inputs, so the conflict cleanup keyed on spent outpoints never reaches its entry; | ||
| // drop it here or it would be re-queued for locking on every block. | ||
| if (tx->IsPlatformTransfer()) { | ||
| RemoveNonLockedTx(tx->GetHash(), false); |
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🔴 Blocking: Preserve withdrawal locks when rejecting another signing instance
TransactionIsRemoved is also called when peer transaction acceptance returns an invalid state (src/net_processing.cpp:5043–5048), even if nothing was removed from the mempool. A peer can copy a locked v2 withdrawal, lower requestedHeight without changing its stable txid, and send the previously unseen instance. AlreadyHave checks its instance hash, and TryAssetUnlockRefresh rejects it as assetunlock-stale-instance before signature verification. This callback then finds the genuine withdrawal's lock by the shared txid and calls RemoveConflictingLock, which removes and archives that lock and its chained children's locks while the transactions remain mempooled. If the withdrawal is not locked yet, the same rejection instead deletes its retry-tracking entry. Distinguish rejected signing instances from actual transaction removal, and add a P2P regression proving that stale or invalid instances cannot clear an existing withdrawal's locks or pending retries.
source: gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general)
| // PreChecks admits an asset unlock alongside another claimant of its withdrawal index only | ||
| // when this one is fresher; the held claimant and its descendants give way now. | ||
| m_pool.removeAssetUnlockConflicts(tx); | ||
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| // Store transaction in memory | ||
| m_pool.addUnchecked(*entry, ws.m_ancestors, validForFeeEstimation); |
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🔴 Blocking: Reject package index conflicts before removing validated parents
This eviction can remove a parent whose outputs another package workspace has already validated. For submitpackage([A, B, child]), let A be a mempooled v1 unlock, B a valid fresher v2 claimant of the same withdrawal index, and child a signed transaction spending outputs from both. If B meets minimum relay fee but is below the current mempool fee floor, individual admission leaves it for package-feerate processing. A is deduplicated, and B plus child pass PreChecks and PolicyScriptChecks while A is still present. SubmitPackage then finalizes B, removing A here. When it subsequently runs the child's ConsensusScriptChecks, CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache finds A's previously cached output in neither the mempool nor the chain UTXO set and trips assert(!coinFromUTXOSet.IsSpent()). CheckPackage only checks ordinary vin conflicts, so the two withdrawal claimants pass its conflict check. Reject conflicting withdrawal indexes across package parents, or account for all prospective evictions before validating package inputs. This is distinct from the explicitly deferred handling of same-txid refreshes in multi-transaction test acceptance.
source: gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general)
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
Users want Platform→Core withdrawals to be rapidly respendable with InstantSend finality. Today that is impossible: an Asset Unlock can expire before it is mined, Platform then re-signs the withdrawal, and because the re-signed transaction has a different txid, any transaction spending the unmined unlock's outputs is invalidated — so spends of unmined unlocks can never be islocked.
This PR implements version 2 Asset Unlock transactions (spec: dashpay/dips#189), activating with
DEPLOYMENT_V24: the txid itself is computed with the quorum signing info (requestedHeight,quorumHash,quorumSig) zeroed — exactly and provably the only fields Platform changes when it re-signs an expired withdrawal. Every re-signed instance of one withdrawal is therefore the same transaction: children reference one stable txid forever and survive expiry and re-signing. This is segwit's txid/wtxid split applied to the quorum-sig fields — no aliasing in the mempool, UTXO set, or wallet layers; the spending model stays completely standard.On top of that, the unlock itself is InstantSend-locked as soon as it can be mined in the next block, using its withdrawal index as a synthetic input. An islock attests "this will be mined and nothing in consensus prevents it"; for an unlock that holds as long as Platform keeps re-signing, which it is obligated to do (there is no refund path), and signing only minable-now instances makes any failure a double fault. Once locked, the withdrawal is like any other locked transaction: children are ordinary islocked spends, the wallet trusts its outputs, and Platform→Core transfers become rapidly respendable.
What was done?
Consensus — hashing rule (
primitives/transaction,evo/assetlocktx)bad-assetunlocktx-version-2, mirroring Asset Lock v2) changes hashing: the txid zeroes the trailing 132 payload bytes. The full-serialization hash remains available asGetInstanceHash()(cached member, equal to the txid for every other transaction).quorumSigand still commits torequestedHeight/quorumHash— and is now computed explicitly from the full serialization (usingGetHash()on the sig-zeroed copy would silently zero all three fields under the new rule). Signature validity rules (48-block window, active-quorum-set+1 recency) are identical to v1.Consensus — coinbase commitment (
evo/cbtx,validation,node/miner,blockencodings)merkleRootAssetUnlocks: the merkle root over the instance hashes of the block's v2 unlocks (null when none). Verified inCheckMerkleRootas a mutation check (bad-cbtx-assetunlockmerkleroot,BLOCK_MUTATED), mirroring segwit's witness commitment: a middleman can flip sig bytes without breaking the merkle root, and treating that as invalidity would let it poison an honest block's hash.getblocktxninstead of being spliced into the reconstructed block;FillBlock's existingIsBlockMutatedcheck backstops short-ID collisions.Mempool (
validation,txmempool,node/transaction,node/miner)requestedHeightis higher, swaps theCTransactionRefin place — descendants, ancestry, and fee accounting untouched because everything the txid covers is identical. Stale/duplicate instances are rejected (assetunlock-stale-instance).sendrawtransactionsubmits refreshes instead of short-circuiting on the known txid.getmempoolinfo.pendingassetunlocks. Mining any instance of a withdrawal evicts every other instance claiming its index.assetunlock-stale-instanceunless itsrequestedHeightis higher, in which case it evicts the held claimant and its descendants, mirroring the in-place refresh. Checked before signature verification. The credit pool lookup in ATMP is wrapped: a local reconstruction failure is aTX_BAD_SPECIALrejection (no peer punishment) and EvoDB corruption an error state, never an escaped exception.InstantSend (
instantsend/*,validation){DIP-27 request id = SHA256d("plwdtx" ‖ index), 0}(instantsend::GetLockInputs). Every instance of one withdrawal, whatever its version or txid, maps to that outpoint, so a lock binds the index to one txid, any other claimant conflicts through the ordinary outpoint conflict path, and a re-sign (same txid) leaves the lock intact. Wire format unchanged.CheckCanLockAssetUnlock): stable-txid instance, passes the full special-tx check at the tip including its quorum signature, no other instance of its index in the mempool (a withdrawal signed as v1 pre-fork can be re-signed as v2 post-fork under a different txid), and the mempool's pending withdrawal total fits the credit pool's current limit. Platform pools withdrawals under the same limit, so a pending total above it indicates a fault and nothing is signed until the window clears. Both the height window and the limit move with the tip, so every tracked unmined unlock is re-evaluated on each connected block; a refresh re-triggers an attempt too.CheckCanLockexception is gone), the wallet trusts a locked withdrawal's outputs viaIsTxLockedByInstantSend, and the mempool's time-based expiry already spares locked transactions.vin.empty()early-out in InstantSend (including the IS-DB block hooks that mark locks mined and the block-connect conflict filter) goes throughHasLockInputs. A peer islock on an unlock whose inputs are anything but the synthetic outpoint is dropped. Mined unlocks are tracked but not locked retroactively, since ChainLocks never wait for them.getassetunlockstatusesreportsinstantlockfor mempooled indexes.P2P relay (
net_processing,protocol,version)MSG_ASSET_UNLOCKinventory type (protocol 70242) announces v2 unlocks by instance hash; getdata is answered with a plaintxmessage; requests and the rejects filter are tracked per instance. Older peers get aMSG_TXannouncement of the current instance and never see refreshes.RPC & signing tooling (
core_write,rpc/quorums,llmq/signing*)instanceHashin v2 unlock JSON.platformsignallows re-signing a request id with a different message hash (truncating the prior recovered sig so the new session isn't short-circuited), andProcessRecoveredSiglets a fresher recovered sig supersede the stored one for the platform quorum type — Platform legitimately re-signs one request id with changing message hashes. Production Platform signing (Tenderdash vote extensions) is unaffected; this aligns Core's local signing path used by tests/tooling.Tests
CMutableTransactionagreement, msgHash semantics, v1 hashing unchanged, DIP-0027 worked-example vectors, CbTx unlock-root calculation.feature_asset_locks.py): pre-fork v2 rejection; spend of an unmined v2 unlock by its stable txid; refresh in place (same txid, child untouched,instanceHashrotates);MSG_ASSET_UNLOCKinv observed for both the initial instance and the refresh; stale-instance rejection; survival of the expired instance + child; window clearing; fresh re-sign mined together with the child; CbTx v4 commitment asserted against the mined instance hash. With InstantSend enabled: the unlock is not locked while the pending total exceeds the limit (an ordinary tx is), the wallet does not trust the child's output, the re-signed minable instance within the limit is locked with the withdrawal index as its single input, the child is then locked through the ordinary path and trusted by the wallet, and a second withdrawal refused on the limit is locked by the per-block retry once the window clears and it is refreshed. Cross-version claimants: a v2 instance signed at the same height as the held v1 instance is rejected, a v2 unlock wrapped in adstxmessage goes through DSTX validation and is dropped, and a v2 instance signed one block later replaces the v1 claimant and gets locked.How Has This Been Tested?
feature_asset_locks.pypasses locally (macOS arm64) including the extendedtest_asset_unlock_v2scenario; alsofeature_llmq_is_retroactive.py,feature_llmq_is_cl_conflicts.py,feature_llmq_chainlocks.py,feature_llmq_singlenode.py,feature_notifications.py,rpc_netinfo.py,p2p_dstx.py,feature_protx_version.py,mempool_unbroadcast.py,interface_rest.py,wallet_basic.py.test_dashunit suite passes.dip-0027/dip-0027-txid-calc.pymatch Core's hashing byte-for-byte (pinned in a unit test).Breaking Changes
NEVER_ACTIVE) are finalized.txid ≠ H(full serialization). Light clients verifying merkle proofs for these transactions and explorer libraries computing txids from raw bytes need the one scoped rule; SPV output tracking and spending are otherwise completely standard.MSG_ASSET_UNLOCKinventory type.Known follow-ups (deliberately out of scope):
core_chain_locked_height); Platform's Tenderdash signing already produces the unchanged message hash.LoadMempoolre-runs acceptance, so an expired v2 instance (and its children) is dropped on restart until the refresh arrives; the islock itself is persisted in the IS DB and wallet rebroadcast heals it. Accepting an expired instance whose txid is islocked on reload is a possible refinement.Transaction::txid(), dash-spv, DashSync, dashj, explorers) needs the scoped v2 rule before activation.MSG_TXannouncement path and for the rejects-filter poisoning scenario a rejected instance is announced over p2p, then a fresh instance must still propagate. The current functional test exercises the mempool refresh andMSG_ASSET_UNLOCKinv end-to-end but drives the stale-instance rejection viasendrawtransaction.AddToWalletis a no-op on a known txid), sogettransactionmay show a stale instance'srequestedHeight/quorumSig; ZMQ/index consumers do observe each refresh. No fund-safety impact (outputs are identical across instances).TryAssetUnlockRefreshis wired into single-tx acceptance only; a refresh submitted via package acceptance would be rejected as a duplicate txid (safe, and not a path Platform/RPC uses).Checklist:
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