feat(platform-wallet): report the balance a pooled build can actually spend - #4582
feat(platform-wallet): report the balance a pooled build can actually spend#4582romchornyi wants to merge 12 commits into
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…was given The wallet-aware finalizers add every unreserved UTXO of the funding account to the candidate pool, so seeding a subset through `core_wallet_tx_builder_add_inputs_from_outpoints` does not restrict what gets selected. A caller draining an account in batches that each stay under the standard-transaction input limit therefore achieves nothing: every batch sees the whole account and fails with a too-many-inputs error, and an account above the cap cannot be drained at all. That is the iOS CoinJoin sweep. A wallet with 589 mixed UTXOs reports "Too many inputs for a standard transaction: 589 (max 500)" on every attempt and every retry; its ~101 DASH cannot be moved by any route the app offers. Exposes key-wallet's opt-in through the FFI and the Swift SDK, and moves the rust-dashcore pin onto a branch carrying it. The pin continues the existing cherry-pick lineage rather than following dev: `chore/sync-fixes-filter-rescans-and-added-inputs` is the current pin (4db5c367) plus dash-spv #866 and #974 — committed-filter-range rescans for newly derived scripts, which address the launch-dependent balances seen on heavily mixed wallets — plus the four key-wallet commits. Pinning dev instead would drag in the sweep-event chain, whose platform-side handling is #4406's subject and which breaks this workspace on seven non-exhaustive matches today.
…was given The wallet-aware finalizers offer every unreserved UTXO of the funding account alongside anything `core_wallet_tx_builder_add_inputs_from_outpoints` seeded, so seeding a subset does not restrict what gets selected. A caller draining an account in batches that each stay under the standard-transaction input limit therefore achieves nothing: every batch sees the whole account and fails with a too-many-inputs error, and an account above the cap cannot be drained at all. That is the iOS CoinJoin sweep. Reproduced on a testnet wallet holding 700 mixed UTXOs: "Too many inputs for a standard transaction: 700 (max 500)" on every attempt; the reporting mainnet wallet has 589 and ~101 DASH it cannot move. key-wallet takes the choice per funding call (dashpay/rust-dashcore#994), and the finalizers make that call internally, so the intent is carried on the FFI builder and read when they run. `finalize_transaction` keeps its signature and delegates to `finalize_transaction_with_options`, so no existing caller changes.
… spend `core_wallet_get_balance` sums every funding account the wallet has — CoinJoin included — and never consults a reservation set. A host gating its amount entry on it therefore offers money the build then refuses, and the shortfall surfaces as CorePooledInsufficientFunds only after the user has committed to an amount. Support ticket 32081 is the shape of it: a wallet reading 94 DASH, of which 0.0054 was actually spendable, everything else on the CoinJoin account the send pool excludes by design. The same mismatch produces the asset-lock shortfall on the Transparent to Shielded path. `pooled_spendable_balance` answers with the accounts `finalize_transaction` funds from, resolved through the same `resolve_source_accounts` and the same source list, counting only UTXOs coin selection accepts. Hosts read it instead of mirroring the pooling rule themselves — the mirror is what drifted here. Reservations are not subtracted: key-wallet keeps each account's ReservationSet private, so reading it needs an accessor there and a pin bump. Documented at every layer. That part is transient — a reservation is released when its spend is processed, on a definitive rejection, at the TTL, or on restart — while the account-set difference is permanent and was the whole of the reported shortfall.
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds pooled spendable and maximum-sendable calculations, applies checked fee, dust, and input-cap handling, corrects FFI handle resolution, and exposes both calculations through ChangesPooled balance APIs
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to This adds pooled gross-balance and fee-aware maximum-sendable wallet APIs across core, FFI, and Swift, with documented reservation and input-cap limitations. No concrete current-head merge-blocking risk remains. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant SwiftClient
participant ManagedCoreWallet
participant FFI
participant CoreWallet
participant FundingResolver
SwiftClient->>ManagedCoreWallet: request pooled balance
ManagedCoreWallet->>FFI: pass account parameters and out-parameter
FFI->>CoreWallet: resolve core-wallet handle and calculate balance
CoreWallet->>FundingResolver: resolve and validate funding accounts
FundingResolver-->>CoreWallet: return eligible accounts and UTXOs
CoreWallet-->>FFI: return balance or error
FFI-->>ManagedCoreWallet: write output and return result
ManagedCoreWallet-->>SwiftClient: return balance or throw error
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Reviewed the three files plus the key-wallet side (add_funding, select_coins_with_size, Utxo::is_spendable) to check the new figure really matches what selection accepts.
The diagnosis is right and the layering is right: .allSpendable → SEND_FUNDING_SOURCES genuinely keeps CoinJoin out, and spendable_utxos(height) genuinely matches select_coins_with_size, which filters candidates by is_spendable(current_height) on every strategy. So the CoinJoin over-report this targets is real and this fixes it.
Three things I think should be settled before merge, all of the same kind — the new function is a second hand-copy of finalize_transaction_with_options' funding loop, and it has already drifted from it in ways that reintroduce the over-report the PR exists to remove:
- Fee is not subtracted. The doc tells hosts to gate amount entry on this, but a build needs
amount + fee. A max-amount send entering the returned value verbatim fails with the sameCorePooledInsufficientFunds. account_of_typeis not checked, so accounts the build skips are still counted.- Single-family selectors (
.bip32,.coinJoin) returnOk(0)wherefinalizereturnsWalletNotFound— the mirror doesn't honourstrict.
Plus a read-only query holding the manager write lock, and the doc comments of finalize_transaction and core_wallet_tx_builder_use_only_added_inputs having been captured by the new functions in both Rust files.
On the untested point — I'd push back gently on shipping this one without a test specifically because the PR's own thesis is that an unpinned mirror of the pooling rule drifts. funded_wallet_manager_dual_standard(&[700_000], &[700_000]) is already in test_support and makes the core assertion about three lines; findings 2 and 3 would both have been caught by it.
Merge-order note in the description looks right and I agree this must not land first.
| let Some(managed) = info.core_wallet.accounts.funds_account_mut(&at) else { | ||
| continue; | ||
| }; | ||
| total += managed |
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The fee isn't subtracted, so this ceiling is still unspendable as an amount.
The doc above says hosts should gate amount entry on this, but the value returned is the gross sum of spendable UTXOs. A build needs amount + fee.
select_coins_with_size passes the total_available < target_amount check with the full sum, and then accumulate_coins_with_size can't cover target + fee — so a user tapping a max/"send all" button wired to this and entering the returned value verbatim gets exactly the CorePooledInsufficientFunds this PR is removing, just relocated from the CoinJoin edge to the max-amount edge.
With the 500-UTXO sweep landing alongside (#4548), the input count and therefore the fee can be well above dust, so this isn't a rounding concern.
Either subtract an estimated fee here, or state in the doc that the figure is pre-fee and hosts must reserve headroom — but given the failure mode this is meant to prevent, I'd rather it be handled here than left as a second thing for hosts to mirror.
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Fixed in dd92e1b — and the reason I gave for not doing it was wrong, so I want to correct that on the record rather than quietly.
I said subtracting the fee here would mean re-declaring key-wallet's per-input and per-output sizes in this crate. It wouldn't: estimate_tx_size and FeeRate are both public in key_wallet::wallet::managed_wallet_info::fee. The trade-off I described didn't exist, so the doc-only answer wasn't the smaller of two evils — it was just the smaller of two amounts of work.
pooled_max_sendable now prices the fee off the inputs that spending everything takes — one output, no change, sizes from key-wallet's estimator, with the per-input cost taken by difference from it rather than written down here, so it can't drift from what the build charges.
Doing it properly turned up something the "subtract an estimated fee" framing hides: it's a selection problem, not a subtraction. A UTXO that doesn't cover the fee its own input adds has to be excluded, because including it lowers the answer. So max_sendable is not gross − fee(all UTXOs).
pooled_max_sendable_is_an_amount_a_build_accepts settles it by building rather than by arithmetic: the gross figure fails finalize_transaction, the net one builds and draws on both accounts — your scenario, run end to end. I deliberately did not make max < gross the assertion, since that passes an estimate that is merely close. Mutation-checked: dropping the fee subtraction reds it.
Kept additive — pooled_spendable_balance still reports the gross sum for an "available" line, and its doc now points here instead of asking hosts to guess headroom.
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| if !seen.insert(at) { | ||
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
| let Some(managed) = info.core_wallet.accounts.funds_account_mut(&at) else { |
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Diverges from finalize here: the account_of_type half of the check is missing.
finalize_transaction_with_options requires both to resolve before it funds an account:
let (Some(account), Some(managed)) = (
wallet.accounts.account_of_type(at),
info.core_wallet.accounts.funds_account_mut(&at),
) else { ... continue; };This counts an account when only funds_account_mut resolves. An AccountType present in info.core_wallet.accounts but absent from wallet.accounts is added to the total and then skipped by the build — an over-report of exactly the shape the PR is fixing.
The discarded _wallet binding on line 331 is where the other half went.
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Fixed. Both halves are now resolved in one place: resolved_funding_accounts does the account_of_type and funds_account lookup and only yields an AccountType when both resolve, and this function drives from it — so the over-report shape you describe can't happen without the build changing too. The discarded _wallet binding is gone; the wallet is a real argument to the resolver now.
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| let mut seen: HashSet<AccountType> = HashSet::new(); | ||
| let mut total: u64 = 0; | ||
| for &preference in sources { |
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Single-source selectors silently return 0 instead of the strict not-found error.
finalize_transaction_with_options sets strict = sources.len() == 1 and errors with WalletNotFound when the named account is missing — pinned by single_source_missing_account_still_errors (line 866). This loop applies the skip-missing rule unconditionally.
CoreAccountTypeFFI::funding_sources() returns a one-element list for BIP44, BIP32 and CoinJoin, so pooledSpendableBalance(accountType: .bip32) on a wallet with no BIP32 account returns Ok(0). The host renders "insufficient funds"; the matching finalize call would have said "no such account". Two different answers to the same selector.
That also makes the doc's "the same accounts finalize_transaction funds from" untrue for every single-family selector — worth either taking a strict flag or narrowing the doc.
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Fixed. The resolver takes a strict flag and both call sites pass the same rule (sources.len() == 1), so a single-family selector on a wallet without that account now errors WalletNotFound here exactly as it does in finalize — no more Ok(0) that the host renders as "insufficient funds" while the matching build says "no such account".
Pinned by a test rather than by inspection: pooled_spendable_balance_reports_the_funding_set_and_stays_strict asserts the [BIP44], index 7 miss errors. Mutation-checked — forcing strict to false makes it fail with got Ok(0), which is the exact symptom you predicted.
The doc's "the same accounts finalize_transaction funds from" is now true for every selector, so it stays as written.
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| sources: &[AccountTypePreference], | ||
| source_index: u32, | ||
| ) -> Result<u64, PlatformWalletError> { | ||
| let mut manager = self.wallet_manager.write().await; |
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Write lock for a pure read.
Nothing here mutates. Read-only equivalents exist and are what the rest of the package uses:
WalletManager::get_wallet_and_info(key-wallet-manager/src/accessors.rs:29)ManagedAccountCollection::funds_account(key-wallet/src/managed_account/managed_account_collection.rs:581)
so this can be .read().await + get_wallet_and_info + funds_account, and the _wallet binding drops out.
It matters because of how this is meant to be called — gating amount entry means potentially one call per keystroke, each taking the exclusive manager lock against concurrent finalizers, broadcast reconciliation and SPV sync writers. Every other read-only path in the package already takes the read lock: sign_message.rs:149, broadcast.rs:136, wallet.rs:372/400, and transaction.rs:650 in this same file.
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Fixed — .read().await + get_wallet_and_info + funds_account, and the _wallet binding dropped out as you said it would. pooled_max_sendable takes the read lock too.
The per-keystroke point is the part that convinced me: an exclusive manager lock contending with finalizers, broadcast reconciliation and SPV sync writers, on a path whose entire purpose is to be called while someone types an amount, would have been a bad trade for nothing.
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| let mut seen: HashSet<AccountType> = HashSet::new(); | ||
| let mut total: u64 = 0; | ||
| for &preference in sources { | ||
| for at in resolve_source_accounts(&info.core_wallet.accounts, preference, source_index) |
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This loop is a second copy of the one in finalize_transaction_with_options (lines ~434-447).
The PR's argument is that the host's hand-copy of the pooling rule drifted, so hosts should read it from the source of truth instead. But the new source of truth is itself a hand-copy of the funding loop — and it has already drifted twice before merge (the two comments above).
Extracting something like
fn resolved_funding_accounts(
accounts: &ManagedAccountCollection,
wallet: &Wallet,
sources: &[AccountTypePreference],
source_index: u32,
strict: bool,
) -> Result<Vec<AccountType>, PlatformWalletError>and driving both call sites from it makes the two impossible to desynchronise, and drops the duplicated dedup HashSet as a side effect. That seems like the depth the fix actually wants to sit at.
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Done, and at the depth you suggested — resolved_funding_accounts with that signature, both finalize_transaction_with_options and this function driving from it. The duplicated dedup HashSet went with it.
Your framing was the useful part: the PR's own argument is that a hand-copy of the pooling rule drifts, and the first draft answered that by adding a second hand-copy which had already drifted twice before review. Hard to argue with.
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| /// is permanent, and was the whole of the shortfall in the report that | ||
| /// prompted it (support ticket 32081: 0.0054 DASH offered as spendable | ||
| /// against a 94 DASH balance, all of it CoinJoin). | ||
| pub async fn pooled_spendable_balance( |
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Worth a test — the fixtures are already there.
mod tests in this file (line 695) has what's needed:
funded_wallet_manager_dual_standard(&[700_000], &[700_000])— already used bypooled_send_spans_families_and_abandon_releases_all; assertingpooled_spendable_balance(&SEND_FUNDING_SOURCES, 0) == 1_400_000is about three lines.funded_wallet_manager_with_contactcovers the DashPay leg.
Nothing currently pins this function to finalize_transaction's account set, which is the one coupling the PR exists to enforce. Both divergences I flagged would be caught by that test.
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Added — bb3ea98, using the fixtures you pointed at.
Four couplings pinned: the pooled selector sums both standard families (1_400_000 from funded_wallet_manager_dual_standard, the three-line assertion you described); a DashPay contact contributes through AllDashpayReceivingFunds; a single-source miss errors WalletNotFound as finalize does; and a CoinJoin-only wallet reports 0 spendable — ticket 32081's gap in miniature.
You were right that both divergences you flagged fall to this: I checked by mutation rather than by assuming, and forcing strict to false reds the strictness leg.
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| @@ -299,6 +299,61 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_source_accounts( | |||
| impl<B: TransactionBroadcaster + ?Sized> CoreWallet<B> { | |||
| /// Consume a configured builder, atomically fund and reserve its selected | |||
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Doc comment got captured by the new function.
The insertion landed between finalize_transaction's doc comment and its signature, so "Consume a configured builder, atomically fund and reserve its selected inputs, then sign without holding the wallet-manager lock." is now the summary line of pooled_spendable_balance — a read-only getter that reserves and signs nothing — running straight on into the real description with no separating ///.
finalize_transaction (line 357) is left with no doc at all.
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Fixed in bb3ea98. finalize_transaction's summary line is back on finalize_transaction, and pooled_spendable_balance's doc starts with its own sentence.
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| /// each stay under the standard-transaction input limit needs this, or every | ||
| /// batch sees the whole account and fails with a too-many-inputs error. | ||
| /// | ||
| /// The balance a build funded by `account_type` could actually select from — the |
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Same capture here.
The doc block starting at line 629 ("Fund the build from the inputs core_wallet_tx_builder_add_inputs_from_outpoints supplied, and nothing else" … "fails with a too-many-inputs error") belongs to core_wallet_tx_builder_use_only_added_inputs, which now sits at line 674 with only the boilerplate # Safety note.
This one leaks further than the Rust-side twin: cbindgen emits these into the generated C header the Swift SDK imports, so the public header will describe a balance getter in terms of batched-drain funding, while use_only_added_inputs — new in the base PR, and whose entire rationale lived in that block — ships with no explanation at all.
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Fixed. The stacking had wedged the balance getter between this doc block and the function it documents; it now sits below core_wallet_tx_builder_use_only_added_inputs, so the block belongs to that function again and the getter has its own.
The header point was the one that made this more than cosmetic — cbindgen emits these, so the public header the Swift SDK imports would have described a balance getter in terms of batched-drain funding while the function whose entire rationale lived in that block shipped bare. Resolved as part of the v4.2-dev merge after #4548 landed (c002d33), which is why it isn't in the later commit.
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…resolver Review found the new balance call had already drifted from the funding loop it was meant to be the truth for — the point of the PR, reproduced inside it. `resolved_funding_accounts` now names the accounts, and both `finalize_transaction_with_options` and `pooled_spendable_balance` are driven from it. Three divergences go with it: - the balance counted an account that resolved only on the managed side, while funding requires both halves and skips otherwise, so it over-reported exactly the shape this PR removes; - single-source selectors returned Ok(0) where funding errors WalletNotFound, giving two answers to the same selector — the strict rule, including the empty SET selector case, now lives in the resolver; - the dedup set existed twice. The balance also takes the read lock rather than the write lock: nothing here mutates, and gating amount entry means a call per keystroke against concurrent finalizers and sync writers. The fee is documented rather than subtracted. Doing it here means re-declaring key-wallet's input and output sizes in this crate, which is the duplication the call exists to remove; the estimate belongs beside FeeRate and MAX_STANDARD_TX_INPUTS.
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All five addressed in 96c8be1, four by code and one by documentation. The duplication one was the right frame — the call meant to end the host's hand-copy was itself a hand-copy, and had drifted twice before merge.
The duplicated dedup Read lock — done, The fee I documented instead of subtracting, and I want to be explicit that this is a judgement call rather than agreement. Subtracting it here means re-declaring key-wallet's per-input and per-output sizes in this crate — the same duplication this call exists to remove, and the thing your last comment argues against. The estimate belongs beside What the doc now says: the figure is gross, a build needs 909 platform-wallet tests pass, 🤖 Generated with Claude Code |
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Thanks — I rechecked A few pieces from the review are still outstanding, though:
Could you address those three points? After that, the review findings look covered from my side. |
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One additional status note: GitHub now reports this branch as conflicting with its base ( |
#4548 landed as a squash, so this branch's copies of its commits no longer match by hash and both files conflicted. Resolved by taking v4.2-dev on every line the two share: the aliasing-safe read (ffi.reservation_only, not through the consumed raw pointer) and the setter doc that now names both finalizers. The pooled-balance entry point moves below the setter instead of splitting its doc comment, where the stacking had wedged it. 938 lib tests pass.
Review asked for this and for the doc capture; both were still open. The getter had no test at all, which is odd for a function whose entire justification is that it must not drift from finalize_transaction's account set - the drift it replaces is a host-side hand-copy of the same rule. Three couplings are now pinned: the pooled selector sums both standard families (1_400_000 from the dual fixture), a DashPay contact account contributes through AllDashpayReceivingFunds, and a single-source miss errors with WalletNotFound exactly as single_source_missing_account_still_errors requires of finalize, rather than answering Ok(0) that a host renders as insufficient funds. A fourth pins the ticket itself: a wallet holding only CoinJoin reports 0 spendable, which is the 94-DASH-against-0.0054 gap from 32081 in miniature. Verified the strictness leg kills its mutant (strict -> false gives Ok(0)). Also return the doc line the insertion captured: finalize_transaction's summary had become the first line of pooled_spendable_balance's doc, leaving finalize undocumented and describing a read-only getter as reserving and signing. The FFI-side twin of this was resolved in the v4.2-dev merge.
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Re-walked all eight comments. Six were already addressed; two were still open and are fixed now in Still open → fixed:
Already addressed in earlier rounds (flagging so you can check I read them the way you meant):
940 lib tests pass, clippy clean on both crates. The branch also carries the 🤖 Generated with Claude Code |
Review's remaining point: the gross balance is not an amount a build accepts, so a host wiring a max control to it relocates the shortfall this API removes from the CoinJoin edge to the max-amount edge. Answered with the number rather than a caveat in the doc. pooled_max_sendable prices the fee off the inputs that spending everything would take - one output, no change - using key-wallet's own estimate_tx_size and FeeRate. The earlier objection that this would re-declare key-wallet's per-input and per-output sizes here was wrong: both are public, and the per-input cost is taken by difference from the estimator rather than as a constant, so it cannot drift from what the build charges. A UTXO whose value does not cover the fee its own input adds is excluded, since including it lowers the answer - the maximum is a selection problem, not a subtraction. Kept additive: pooled_spendable_balance still reports the gross sum, which is what an available-balance line should show, and its doc now points at the net figure instead of asking hosts to guess headroom. New FFI entry point takes a fee rate (0 = the builder default) and the Swift wrapper mirrors it. Two tests, both mutation-checked. The first settles the question by building rather than by arithmetic: the gross figure fails finalize_transaction, the net one builds and takes both accounts' inputs with it - asserting only max < gross would pass an estimate that is merely close. The second pins the dust rule. 942 lib tests pass.
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Coming back on the fee one — I took the doc option earlier and gave a reason that doesn't hold up. Fixed properly in My stated reason was that subtracting the fee here would mean re-declaring key-wallet's per-input and per-output sizes in this crate. That was simply wrong:
One thing that fell out of doing it properly: this is a selection problem, not a subtraction. A UTXO whose value doesn't cover the fee its own input adds has to be excluded — including it lowers the answer — so Kept additive rather than changing the existing getter: Two tests, both mutation-checked:
Mutants: dropping the fee subtraction reds the first; the strictness mutant from the previous round still reds its own test. Two limits are documented as deliberately not modelled, both of which can only make the real ceiling lower, never higher: reservations held by another in-flight build, and the standard-transaction input cap — 942 lib tests pass, clippy clean on both crates. That closes all eight comments on this PR. 🤖 Generated with Claude Code |
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In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs`:
- Line 492: Update pooled_max_sendable to cap the eligible UTXO count using the
same key-wallet transaction input limit enforced by finalize_transaction before
calculating the fee and maximum sendable amount. Preserve the existing
profitable-UTXO selection behavior within that cap, and add a regression test
covering more eligible UTXOs than the limit.
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…imit A pool holding more eligible UTXOs than one transaction can carry was summed whole, so the reported maximum named an amount no build could reach - the same class of over-report this API exists to remove, just at a different edge. The figure is now taken from the largest MAX_STANDARD_TX_INPUTS UTXOs, and the doc says the money beyond the cap is unreachable in a single send rather than gone. key-wallet enforces the limit but keeps the constant private, so it is mirrored here. Rather than trust the mirror, the regression test builds against a wallet holding one UTXO more than the cap: the uncapped amount is refused, the capped one builds and fills the transaction exactly to the cap. Raising the mirror above key-wallet's real limit therefore reds the test - verified with 600. Lowering it does not, and cannot: every assertion is written in terms of the mirror and moves with it. Both the constant's doc and the test say so plainly rather than claiming a guarantee in both directions; under-reporting is conservative, over-reporting is the failure. Making the key-wallet constant public - it sits one line from MAX_STANDARD_OP_RETURN_BYTES, which was made public for this exact reason - would remove the mirror, at the cost of a pin bump on this branch. 943 lib tests pass.
…re-wallet table `core_wallet_pooled_spendable_balance` and `core_wallet_pooled_max_sendable` are exposed on the core wallet (`ManagedCoreWallet` in the Swift SDK), so the handle they receive is the one `platform_wallet_get_core` issues — a `CORE_WALLET_STORAGE` entry, the same one `core_wallet_get_balance` takes. Both were written beside the `core_wallet_tx_builder_*` entry points and copied their lookup, `PLATFORM_WALLET_STORAGE.with_item(handle)`. Handles come from one global counter, so a core handle is never present in the platform table: every call failed with `ErrorInvalidHandle`. The Swift caller swallowed that error and published a permanent 0, which zeroed Max and blocked every send in the 2026-09-03 QA build (dashwallet-ios#1107) — for every wallet, mixed or not, which is what both QA and a support report hit. Reproduced on a fresh 2 tDASH testnet wallet. Resolve through `CORE_WALLET_STORAGE`, name the parameter for what it is, and pin the contract with tests: a core handle returns the same figure as the direct `CoreWallet` call, and an unknown handle is refused with the out-parameter left at 0. The positive test fails on the old lookup with `NotFound`.
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## v4.2-dev #4582 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 86.13% 86.95% +0.81%
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Files 2796 2767 -29
Lines 367966 364480 -3486
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- Hits 316958 316917 -41
+ Misses 51008 47563 -3445
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All eight points from the previous round are addressed, and several of them better than what I asked for. Re-checked against key-wallet rather than taking the diff's word for it:
- Fee —
pooled_max_sendableis the right shape: it prices the fee off the inputs a drain would actually take rather than subtracting from the gross figure, and dropping UTXOs whose value doesn't cover their own input cost makes it a true maximum instead of an approximation.per_inputderived fromestimate_tx_sizeby difference is a nice touch —estimate_tx_sizeis10 + 148·inputs + 34·outputs, strictly linear, so the difference is exact and nothing is re-declared here that could drift. MAX_STANDARD_TX_INPUTS = 500matches key-wallet's private constant (transaction_builder.rs:29, enforced at :542). The doc's reasoning about which direction the test can pin is correct and honestly stated.- Account-set and strictness divergence — both gone, and gone at the right depth:
resolved_funding_accountsis now the single resolver, withfinalize_transaction_with_optionsdriving off it. - Write lock — now
.read()+get_wallet_and_info+funds_account. - Docs — the FFI capture is fixed and
use_only_added_inputshas its rationale back (one new instance below). - Tests — these are stronger than I suggested. Asserting by building rather than by arithmetic is the right call:
pooled_max_sendable_is_an_amount_a_build_acceptsrunning both the gross and the net figure throughfinalize_transactionis exactly the proof the claim needs, andpooled_max_sendable_respects_the_input_capfilling a transaction to exactly the cap pins the mirrored constant in the direction that can actually break the promise.
Also noting the handle-table bug the QA build turned up (CORE_WALLET_STORAGE vs PLATFORM_WALLET_STORAGE) — I missed that one entirely last round, and unknown_handle_is_refused_with_zero_out is a good regression pin for it.
Approving. Three cosmetic things below and one request, none blocking:
Please refresh the description before merge. It still describes only the three balance entry points — pooled_max_sendable / core_wallet_pooled_max_sendable / pooledMaxSendable aren't mentioned at all — still says "Based on #4548 rather than v4.2-dev … rebase once that lands" after the rebase, still lists #4548 as pending in the merge order, and still has the test checkbox unticked with ~300 lines of new tests in the diff. Since the description becomes the squash commit body, it's worth a pass.
Merge-order caveat from last time still stands and the remaining ordering looks right.
| /// DashPay source. A set selector matching nothing resolves to an empty list, | ||
| /// not an error — a wallet with no contacts still sends from its standard | ||
| /// accounts. | ||
| /// The accounts a pooled build will actually fund from, in funding order and |
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Non-blocking, but: the doc capture happened again here, in the fix for the previous two.
The block above ("The concrete accounts preference resolves to at source_index — the platform mirror of key-wallet's private account_types_for … A set selector matching nothing resolves to an empty list, not an error") belongs to resolve_source_accounts. The insertion landed between it and its signature, so it now heads resolved_funding_accounts and runs straight into this text with no separating /// — and resolve_source_accounts is left with no doc.
That's three times in this PR, always the same mechanism: adding a function directly above an existing one, between its doc and its fn. Worth a glance at the rendered rustdoc before merge rather than the diff, since the diff makes it invisible.
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Fixed in e9c69dd — the doc block is back on resolve_source_accounts, and resolved_funding_accounts keeps its own.
Three times, same mechanism, and you're right that the diff is exactly the wrong place to catch it: inserting a function above an existing one shows as a clean addition whether or not the /// above it belonged to the function below. Rendered rustdoc before merge, not the diff.
| if strict && resolved.is_empty() { | ||
| return Err(PlatformWalletError::WalletNotFound(format!( | ||
| "wallet account {:?} #{source_index} not found", | ||
| sources.first() |
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Nit: sources.first() is an Option, so {:?} renders this as wallet account Some(BIP44) #0 not found. The version this replaced formatted {preference:?} and produced BIP44.
The branch is reachable (strict + a DashPay set selector matching nothing), and strict guarantees the Option is Some, so it's always the noisy form. sources.first().map(...) or just indexing under the strict invariant would restore the old text.
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Fixed in e9c69dd. It's a match sources.first() now, so the reachable branch formats the preference itself and prints wallet account BIP44 #0 not found again; the None arm gets its own wording rather than leaning on the strict invariant with an unwrap.
| source_index, | ||
| strict, | ||
| )?; | ||
| { |
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Leftover from the edit: this bare block now wraps only the for loop and can go.
Related — with resolved_funding_accounts already checking both halves, the let (Some(account), Some(managed)) = (…) else { continue; } just below is a branch that can no longer be taken. Keeping it as a defensive destructure is fine (you need account and managed bound anyway), but if you'd rather it not read as live error handling, expect-ing with a note that the resolver guarantees it would say so.
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Fixed in e9c69dd — block removed, body dedented.
On the related point: I kept the let (Some(account), Some(managed)) = … else { continue; } and added a comment saying resolved_funding_accounts already dropped anything missing from either half, so the continue is not a reachable skip. Preferred that to expect — this is library code reached across the FFI, and I'd rather not introduce a panic path to document an invariant.
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Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)
Verified all supplied findings against the exact head and pinned key-wallet dependency, consolidating the duplicate fee-overflow reports into one finding. The three existing send-max tests pass, while temporary independent probes confirmed the input-cap failure, dust-sized maximum, overflow panic, and ineffective negative cap assertion; the probes were removed and the working tree is clean. These are client-wallet correctness and test-coverage issues, classified as suggestions under the supplied policy for non-consensus findings.
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 3: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
Review provenance
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — The change touches wallet fund availability and fee-adjusted maximum-send calculations across Rust, FFI, and Swift, where mistakes in account selection, UTXO eligibility, reservations, or input limits could misrepresent spendable funds and cause transaction failures. - Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 48 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🟡 4 suggestion(s)
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs:491: Validate fee arithmetic before calling the upstream calculator
The new getter accepts an unrestricted FeeRate, and the new FFI entry point forwards its u64 argument without validation. In the pinned key-wallet dependency, calculate_fee computes `(sat_per_kb * size_bytes as u64).div_ceil(1000)` using unchecked multiplication. An independent native probe with FeeRate::new(u64::MAX) panicked on the initial 148-byte input calculation instead of returning PlatformWalletError. The exported extern "C" function has no panic containment, and dev-ios explicitly uses panic = "abort", so this failure terminates the host rather than becoming a Swift error. Builds without overflow checks can instead calculate wrapped fees. Validate the multiplication bounds for both the per-input and complete transaction calculations, or use checked/wider arithmetic and propagate a typed error through the ABI. Add boundary-value tests; a panic guard alone does not protect panic-abort builds.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs:512-518: The capped estimate can still make finalization select more than 500 inputs
Truncating the estimator's value list does not constrain the UTXOs offered to finalization. The default BranchAndBound selector rounds each input's effective fee separately, while this getter rounds once over the complete transaction. With 500 confirmed 10,000-duff UTXOs, one additional 575-duff UTXO, and FeeRate::new(1001), an independent probe confirmed that pooled_max_sendable returns 4,925,881, but finalizing a single P2PKH output for that amount at the same rate fails with `Too many inputs for a standard transaction: 501 (max 500)`. The additional input fills the selector's rounding gap even though the estimator excluded it. Make estimation and finalization agree on a cap-valid selection, or enforce the input cap during selection with a cap-valid fallback. Extend the buildability regression to fractional-duffs-per-byte rates.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs:517-519: Return no sendable amount when the net output would be dust
The subtraction only checks whether the selected inputs cover the fee; it does not check whether the resulting payment clears the modeled output's dust threshold. An independent funded-wallet probe confirmed that one confirmed, unreserved 600-duff UTXO produces a maximum of 408 duffs at the default rate, while the modeled P2PKH output's script_pubkey().dust_value() is 546 duffs. A host using the documented send-max value therefore offers a positive payment that standard relay policy rejects. Return zero or an explicit no-sendable-amount result when the net amount is below the modeled output's dust threshold, and cover the below-threshold and threshold boundaries.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs:1355-1363: Make the cap test reach the too-many-inputs rejection
This negative case requests 5,000,001 duffs from 5,010,000 duffs of inputs, leaving too little for the 74,192-duff fee. An independent probe confirmed that it returns CoreInsufficientFunds with required 5,074,193 before reaching the input-cap check. Consequently, this assertion still passes if the dependency removes or raises its cap; it does not establish the claimed uncapped-send rejection. Use the gross amount minus the estimated 501-input fee—4,935,808 duffs for this fixture—and assert that rejection is specifically attributable to too many inputs. That amount independently reproduced the intended 501-input rejection.
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| // A UTXO earns its place only if it brings in more than its own input | ||
| // costs at this rate; the rest are dead weight and are dropped. | ||
| let input_cost = fee_rate.calculate_fee(per_input); |
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🟡 Suggestion: Validate fee arithmetic before calling the upstream calculator
The new getter accepts an unrestricted FeeRate, and the new FFI entry point forwards its u64 argument without validation. In the pinned key-wallet dependency, calculate_fee computes (sat_per_kb * size_bytes as u64).div_ceil(1000) using unchecked multiplication. An independent native probe with FeeRate::new(u64::MAX) panicked on the initial 148-byte input calculation instead of returning PlatformWalletError. The exported extern "C" function has no panic containment, and dev-ios explicitly uses panic = "abort", so this failure terminates the host rather than becoming a Swift error. Builds without overflow checks can instead calculate wrapped fees. Validate the multiplication bounds for both the per-input and complete transaction calculations, or use checked/wider arithmetic and propagate a typed error through the ABI. Add boundary-value tests; a panic guard alone does not protect panic-abort builds.
source: ['claude']
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Fixed in e9c69dd. checked_fee does key-wallet's arithmetic with checked_mul and returns PlatformWalletError::TransactionBuild instead, and both call sites — the per-input cost and the whole-transaction fee — go through it.
The panic = "abort" point is the one that settled the shape of the fix: a guard that catches the panic would be useless on the profile that matters, so the multiplication must not be attempted at all. Doing it platform-side rather than at the FFI boundary also covers the Rust callers, not just the exported entry point.
Boundary tests added in pooled_max_sendable_refuses_a_fee_rate_that_would_overflow: FeeRate::new(u64::MAX) is an error, and u64::MAX / per_input — the largest rate whose per-input fee still fits — computes and returns 0, because at that rate no UTXO outearns its own input cost. Zero is the right answer there and, more to the point, it is an answer.
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Resolved (re-reviewed at e9c69ddb): Both the per-input and complete-transaction calculations now use checked_fee, whose checked multiplication returns PlatformWalletError::TransactionBuild instead of overflowing in the upstream calculator. The overflow and highest-safe-per-input-rate regression passes at the reviewed head.
| if values.len() > MAX_STANDARD_TX_INPUTS { | ||
| values.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| b.cmp(a)); | ||
| values.truncate(MAX_STANDARD_TX_INPUTS); | ||
| } | ||
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| let selected: u64 = values.iter().sum(); | ||
| let fee = fee_rate.calculate_fee(estimate_tx_size(values.len(), 1, false)); |
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🟡 Suggestion: The capped estimate can still make finalization select more than 500 inputs
Truncating the estimator's value list does not constrain the UTXOs offered to finalization. The default BranchAndBound selector rounds each input's effective fee separately, while this getter rounds once over the complete transaction. With 500 confirmed 10,000-duff UTXOs, one additional 575-duff UTXO, and FeeRate::new(1001), an independent probe confirmed that pooled_max_sendable returns 4,925,881, but finalizing a single P2PKH output for that amount at the same rate fails with Too many inputs for a standard transaction: 501 (max 500). The additional input fills the selector's rounding gap even though the estimator excluded it. Make estimation and finalization agree on a cap-valid selection, or enforce the input cap during selection with a cap-valid fallback. Extend the buildability regression to fractional-duffs-per-byte rates.
source: ['claude']
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Confirmed and not fixed in e9c69dd — deliberately carved out of this round so the other four findings could land while this one is designed properly. Flagging it here rather than closing it quietly.
The mechanism is as you describe: the estimator rounds the fee once over the whole transaction, BranchAndBound rounds each input's effective fee separately, and the 501st input fits in the gap that difference leaves. Truncating the value list only shrinks the number being reported; it does nothing to what finalization is offered, so the two can disagree wherever the rate is not a whole number of duffs per byte.
That is a real divergence between what the API promises and what a build accepts, and neither cheap fix is right:
- rounding the estimate the way the selector does would couple this crate to a selection strategy the caller can change;
- clamping the reported figure by some margin would under-report on every wallet to cover a case that needs a cap.
What it looks like it wants is for the cap to be enforced during selection, with a cap-valid fallback, so estimation and finalization cannot disagree by construction — which is a change to the selector's contract, not to this getter. I would rather do that as its own PR than bolt an approximation onto this one.
The buildability regression will be extended to fractional duffs-per-byte rates as part of that work, since today it would just document the divergence rather than close it.
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Still applies (re-reviewed at e9c69ddb): The verifier kept this finding on the current head; see the updated review.
| let selected: u64 = values.iter().sum(); | ||
| let fee = fee_rate.calculate_fee(estimate_tx_size(values.len(), 1, false)); | ||
| Ok(selected.saturating_sub(fee)) |
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🟡 Suggestion: Return no sendable amount when the net output would be dust
The subtraction only checks whether the selected inputs cover the fee; it does not check whether the resulting payment clears the modeled output's dust threshold. An independent funded-wallet probe confirmed that one confirmed, unreserved 600-duff UTXO produces a maximum of 408 duffs at the default rate, while the modeled P2PKH output's script_pubkey().dust_value() is 546 duffs. A host using the documented send-max value therefore offers a positive payment that standard relay policy rejects. Return zero or an explicit no-sendable-amount result when the net amount is below the modeled output's dust threshold, and cover the below-threshold and threshold boundaries.
source: ['claude']
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Fixed in e9c69dd. pooled_max_sendable now returns 0 when the net amount falls below the modeled output's dust threshold.
The threshold is read off the same output the size estimate models — estimate_tx_size(_, 1, false) assumes one P2PKH — so modeled_output_script() builds a P2PKH script over a zero hash and takes its dust_value(). Only the script's encoded length matters to that call, which is what makes the placeholder legitimate: at send-max time the caller has not chosen a destination yet.
pooled_max_sendable_reports_nothing_when_the_net_output_would_be_dust covers both sides, derived from the same primitives rather than hardcoded: dust + fee - 1 reports 0, dust + fee reports exactly dust.
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Resolved (re-reviewed at e9c69ddb): The getter now compares the net amount against the modeled P2PKH output's dust threshold and returns zero below it. Both boundary assertions pass: dust plus fee minus one reports zero, while dust plus fee reports exactly the threshold.
| // Anything needing the UTXO beyond the cap is unbuildable — this is the | ||
| // amount an uncapped maximum would have offered. | ||
| let over = core | ||
| .finalize_transaction(spend(capped_value + 1, 80), sources, 0, &signer) | ||
| .await; | ||
| assert!( | ||
| over.is_err(), | ||
| "an amount requiring more than the cap must not build, got {over:?}" | ||
| ); |
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🟡 Suggestion: Make the cap test reach the too-many-inputs rejection
This negative case requests 5,000,001 duffs from 5,010,000 duffs of inputs, leaving too little for the 74,192-duff fee. An independent probe confirmed that it returns CoreInsufficientFunds with required 5,074,193 before reaching the input-cap check. Consequently, this assertion still passes if the dependency removes or raises its cap; it does not establish the claimed uncapped-send rejection. Use the gross amount minus the estimated 501-input fee—4,935,808 duffs for this fixture—and assert that rejection is specifically attributable to too many inputs. That amount independently reproduced the intended 501-input rejection.
source: ['claude']
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Fixed in e9c69dd, and you were right about what it was actually asserting — 5,000,001 against 5,010,000 of inputs fails on funds at required 5,074,193, well before anything looks at the input count.
It now asks for gross - fee(501 inputs, 1 output) — computed from estimate_tx_size, which lands on the 4,935,808 you named for this fixture — and matches on the error rather than just is_err(), asserting the message is the too-many-inputs one.
One thing worth recording, because it reads wrong at first glance: that amount is below capped_value (5,000,000), since the 501st input's fee costs more than the 10,000 duffs it brings. What forces the build past the cap is not the amount exceeding the capped pool, it is the amount exceeding what a 500-input build can pay for. My first attempt asserted uncapped_max > capped_value and the test caught it.
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Resolved (re-reviewed at e9c69ddb): The negative case now requests gross minus the estimated cap-plus-one-input fee and specifically checks the too-many-inputs rejection, rather than accepting an insufficient-funds failure. The updated regression passes at the reviewed head.
Three defects in `pooled_max_sendable`, all found in review. The fee arithmetic could not hold every rate a caller may pass. key-wallet's `FeeRate::calculate_fee` multiplies `sat_per_kb * size_bytes` unchecked, and the rate arrives as a `u64` the host picks and `core_wallet_pooled_max_sendable` forwards verbatim. The iOS profile builds with `panic = "abort"`, so an overflow there ends the process instead of the call, and a profile without overflow checks wraps into a fee that makes the answer nonsense. `checked_fee` does the same arithmetic with `checked_mul` and returns a typed error instead. Covering the fee was also being mistaken for being spendable. A net output below the modeled script's dust threshold is refused by standard relay, so reporting it names a payment that cannot be made: one confirmed 600-duff UTXO advertised 408 duffs against a 546-duff threshold. Below the threshold now reports nothing sendable, the same answer an empty pool gives. The input-cap test did not test the input cap. Asking for `capped_value + 1` leaves too little for the 501-input fee, so it failed on funds before reaching the cap and would have kept passing if key-wallet dropped its cap entirely. It now asks for the gross total minus that fee — which is *below* `capped_value`, because the 501st input's fee costs more than the 10,000 duffs it brings, and which needs that input because it exceeds what a 500-input build can pay — and asserts the refusal is specifically the too-many-inputs one. Also from review, in `resolved_funding_accounts`: the doc block belonging to `resolve_source_accounts` had been captured by the function inserted above it; the strict-miss error formatted `sources.first()` and so printed `Some(BIP44)` where it used to print `BIP44`; and a bare block left over from an earlier edit wrapped only the funding loop.
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4 participants
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
core_wallet_get_balancesums every funding account the wallet has — CoinJoin included — and neverconsults a reservation set. A host that gates its amount entry on it offers money the build then
refuses, and the shortfall surfaces as
CorePooledInsufficientFundsonly after the user has committedto an amount.
Ticket 32081 is the shape of it: a wallet reading 94 DASH, of which 0.0054 was actually
spendable — everything else sat on the CoinJoin account, which
SEND_FUNDING_SOURCESexcludes bydesign. The user was offered a 1 DASH send, entered it, and got
The same mismatch produces
asset lock coin selection is shorton Transparent → Shielded, with theidentical
available 538503.What was done?
CoreWallet::pooled_spendable_balance(sources, source_index), pluscore_wallet_pooled_spendable_balanceandManagedCoreWallet.pooledSpendableBalance(...).It resolves accounts through the same
resolve_source_accountsand the same source listfinalize_transactionuses, and counts only UTXOs coin selection accepts. Hosts read it instead ofmirroring the pooling rule — the mirror is exactly what drifted: the app's own comment claims
.allSpendablepools "the same set the home balance already totals", which was never true.Reservations are not subtracted. key-wallet keeps each account's
ReservationSetprivate, soreading it needs an accessor there and a pin bump. Documented at all three layers. That part is
transient — released when the spend is processed, on a definitive rejection, at the TTL, or on restart
— while the account-set difference is permanent and was the whole of the reported shortfall.
How Has This Been Tested?
cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib— 909 passed, 0 failed.dashpayTestnet target compiles against it with the hostside wired (fix(build): restore dashpay compilation dashwallet-ios#1095).
Not yet exercised against a live CoinJoin-heavy wallet: the testnet wallet built for this work has
since been swept, so the state has to be rebuilt to see the ceiling change.
Breaking Changes
None. New read-only entry point; no existing behaviour changes.
Merge order
This is one of three defects behind ticket 32081, and this one must not land first: it lowers the
ceiling the amount screen shows, so a user with mixed coins sees less. That is only safe once the
sweep works and can unlock the difference.
Based on #4548 rather than
v4.2-devto avoid conflicting intransaction.rs; rebase once that lands.Checklist:
For repository code-owners and collaborators only
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes