Security: GcsArtifactService missing input validation on path components allows cross-user artifact access (CWE-22)

[Ashutosh0x]

Summary

GcsArtifactService._get_blob_prefix() constructs GCS blob paths by directly interpolating user_id, app_name, and session_id into f-strings without any validation. A user_id containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ../other-user) allows an attacker to read, write, or delete another user's artifacts in the same GCS bucket.

Vulnerability

File: src/google/adk/artifacts/gcs_artifact_service.py, lines 156-171

python def _get_blob_prefix(self, app_name, user_id, filename, session_id=None): # No validation on app_name, user_id, or session_id if self._file_has_user_namespace(filename): return f'{app_name}/{user_id}/user/{filename}' return f'{app_name}/{user_id}/{session_id}/{filename}'

Attack

A user_id of ../victim-user constructs:
app_name/../victim-user/user/filename -> victim-user/user/filename

This allows User A to:

• Read User B's artifacts (_load_artifact)
• Overwrite User B's artifacts (_save_artifact)
• Delete User B's artifacts (_delete_artifact)

Comparison with FileArtifactService

FileArtifactService in the same package already validates these inputs via _validate_path_segment() (line 141-163), which rejects path separators, .., and null bytes. GcsArtifactService lacks this validation entirely.

Impact

• Cross-user data access in multi-tenant deployments using GCS-backed artifact storage
• Data destruction via cross-user artifact deletion
• CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory

Fix

Add _validate_gcs_path_segment() with the same checks as FileArtifactService._validate_path_segment(), and call it in _get_blob_prefix() before constructing blob paths.

References

• CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
• Related: Security: Path Traversal in _load_skill_from_gcs_dir enables arbitrary file write (VRP #499557362) #5603 (GCS skill path traversal, fixed in PR Security: Fix path traversal in GCS skill extraction (Zip Slip) #5927)

[surajksharma07]

@Ashutosh0x confirmed the path traversal in _get_blob_prefix(), and the approach in PR #6116 (adding _validate_gcs_path_segment() to mirror what FileArtifactService already does) is exactly the right direction.

Could you make sure the 10 unit tests cover all four operations (save, load, delete, list) before we kick off the review on #6116?

Once you've verified the fix holds up end-to-end on your setup, we'll move forward with the review.

[Ashutosh0x]

Thanks @surajksharma07! I've updated the tests in PR #6116 to cover all four operations. The test file now has:

Unit tests (10) - _validate_gcs_path_segment() directly:

• Valid user IDs pass
• ../ traversal blocked
• .. and . blocked
• Forward slash, backslash, null byte blocked
• Empty values blocked
• app_name and session_id traversal blocked

Operation-level tests (8) - through the async public API with mocked GCS client:

• save_artifact - rejects traversal user_id, traversal app_name, null byte user_id
• load_artifact - rejects traversal user_id, traversal session_id
• delete_artifact - rejects traversal user_id, backslash user_id
• list_artifact_keys - rejects traversal user_id, .. user_id

Total: 18 tests covering all four operations and all validation rules.

Each operation-level test uses unittest.mock to mock the GCS client, confirming that InputValidationError is raised before any GCS call is made. Ready for review!

[surajksharma07]

@Ashutosh0x Confirmed, thanks — the 18 tests cover all four operations (save/load/delete/list) plus the segment-validation unit cases, and #6116 is green across CI (header-check, change-validation, CLA).

Team is looking more into it.
Thanks!