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Security: helloworld1/FreeOTPPlus

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Security fixes are applied to the latest release on the master branch. Please ensure you are running the latest version from Google Play, F-Droid, or GitHub Releases before reporting an issue.

Version Supported
>= 3.5 Yes
< 3.5 No

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues, discussions, or pull requests.

Instead, please report vulnerabilities privately using GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting.

When submitting a report, please include:

  • Affected FreeOTP+ version and Android OS version
  • A clear description of the vulnerability and its security impact
  • Step-by-step reproduction instructions or a minimal proof-of-concept (PoC)
  • Any suggested remediation, if applicable

We will review reports on a best-effort basis, work on a fix if confirmed, and coordinate disclosure once a patched release is available.

Security Model & Scope

Authentication Modes & Token Secret Encryption

FreeOTP+ offers three user-selectable authentication modes:

  • None (default): Opens directly without an app-launch prompt; token secrets are stored in plaintext within the app-private Room database.
  • App launch: Requires system biometric or device credential (BIOMETRIC_WEAK | DEVICE_CREDENTIAL) on app launch and after a 2-minute background timeout; token secrets remain stored in plaintext within the app-private Room database.
  • Token encrypted: Encrypts each token secret at rest using AES-256-GCM (random 96-bit IV, 128-bit authentication tag) under a 256-bit key derived from a user-entered key (>= 6 characters) via PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (150,000 iterations, 128-bit random salt). When strong biometrics (BIOMETRIC_STRONG) are enrolled, the derived key is wrapped with an AndroidKeyStore AES-256-GCM key (setUserAuthenticationRequired(true), invalidated upon biometric enrollment changes) and unwrapped via BiometricPrompt.CryptoObject on launch, falling back to manual key entry when biometrics are unavailable or invalidated.

In Scope

  • Bypass of the Authentication mode (App launch or Token encrypted) lock screen, or bypass of secret-reveal, token-share, or export authentication prompts from within an unprivileged context
  • Cryptographic implementation flaws in Token encrypted mode (key derivation, AndroidKeyStore biometric key wrapping, AES-256-GCM token secret encryption, or encrypted backup export/import)
  • Unauthorized cross-app access to OTP secrets or codes on non-rooted Android devices
  • Vulnerabilities in otpauth:// URI handling, QR code scanning, or JSON / Key URI import parsing (e.g., injection, spoofing, or silent state modification without user confirmation)
  • Unintended exposure of sensitive data in logs, broadcasts, or unprotected exported components

Known Design Choices (Out of Scope)

The following behaviors are intentional design trade-offs for usability and interoperability and are not considered vulnerabilities on their own:

  • Rooted devices / physical debug access: In None and App launch modes, FreeOTP+ relies on the Android OS application sandbox and device encryption to protect app-private storage (Room database). In Token encrypted mode, token secrets are encrypted at rest, but runtime memory inspection while unlocked, offline brute-force of weak user-chosen keys, or attacks requiring root privileges, unlocked bootloaders, custom ROMs, or authenticated adb access are out of scope.
  • Unencrypted token metadata: In Token encrypted mode, only the OTP secret is encrypted; non-secret metadata (issuer, label, category, algorithm, digits, period, counter, imagePath) remains unencrypted to support listing, searching, category filtering, and HOTP counter updates.
  • Backups, exports, and single-token sharing:
    • In None and App launch modes, JSON / Key URI exports and Android system backup (allowBackup="true") store token secrets without app-layer encryption for cross-device and cross-app portability.
    • In Token encrypted mode, Android system backup stores encrypted token secrets (recoverable on a new device using the user's encryption key), and bulk JSON / Key URI exports let the user choose between encrypted (freeotp-backup-encrypted_<datetime>.json / .txt) and decrypted files.
    • Single-token sharing (Share QR Code and Share to other apps) always outputs unencrypted otpauth:// URIs after authentication so target services and authenticator apps can scan them. Users remain responsible for securing decrypted backup files and shared QR codes.
  • Optional authentication and encryption: App-launch authentication and token secret encryption are opt-in in settings (None is the default); secret reveal, token sharing, and exports require authentication whenever a system screen lock is configured (or encryption key verification in Token encrypted mode when no screen lock is configured).
Learn more about advisories related to helloworld1/FreeOTPPlus in the GitHub Advisory Database