Security fixes are applied to the latest release on the master branch. Please ensure you are running the latest version from Google Play, F-Droid, or GitHub Releases before reporting an issue.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| >= 3.5 | Yes |
| < 3.5 | No |
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues, discussions, or pull requests.
Instead, please report vulnerabilities privately using GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting.
When submitting a report, please include:
- Affected FreeOTP+ version and Android OS version
- A clear description of the vulnerability and its security impact
- Step-by-step reproduction instructions or a minimal proof-of-concept (PoC)
- Any suggested remediation, if applicable
We will review reports on a best-effort basis, work on a fix if confirmed, and coordinate disclosure once a patched release is available.
FreeOTP+ offers three user-selectable authentication modes:
- None (default): Opens directly without an app-launch prompt; token secrets are stored in plaintext within the app-private
Roomdatabase. - App launch: Requires system biometric or device credential (
BIOMETRIC_WEAK | DEVICE_CREDENTIAL) on app launch and after a 2-minute background timeout; token secrets remain stored in plaintext within the app-privateRoomdatabase. - Token encrypted: Encrypts each token secret at rest using AES-256-GCM (random 96-bit IV, 128-bit authentication tag) under a 256-bit key derived from a user-entered key (
>= 6characters) via PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (150,000 iterations, 128-bit random salt). When strong biometrics (BIOMETRIC_STRONG) are enrolled, the derived key is wrapped with anAndroidKeyStoreAES-256-GCM key (setUserAuthenticationRequired(true), invalidated upon biometric enrollment changes) and unwrapped viaBiometricPrompt.CryptoObjecton launch, falling back to manual key entry when biometrics are unavailable or invalidated.
- Bypass of the Authentication mode (
App launchorToken encrypted) lock screen, or bypass of secret-reveal, token-share, or export authentication prompts from within an unprivileged context - Cryptographic implementation flaws in Token encrypted mode (key derivation,
AndroidKeyStorebiometric key wrapping, AES-256-GCM token secret encryption, or encrypted backup export/import) - Unauthorized cross-app access to OTP secrets or codes on non-rooted Android devices
- Vulnerabilities in
otpauth://URI handling, QR code scanning, or JSON / Key URI import parsing (e.g., injection, spoofing, or silent state modification without user confirmation) - Unintended exposure of sensitive data in logs, broadcasts, or unprotected exported components
The following behaviors are intentional design trade-offs for usability and interoperability and are not considered vulnerabilities on their own:
- Rooted devices / physical debug access: In None and App launch modes, FreeOTP+ relies on the Android OS application sandbox and device encryption to protect app-private storage (
Roomdatabase). In Token encrypted mode, token secrets are encrypted at rest, but runtime memory inspection while unlocked, offline brute-force of weak user-chosen keys, or attacks requiringrootprivileges, unlocked bootloaders, custom ROMs, or authenticatedadbaccess are out of scope. - Unencrypted token metadata: In Token encrypted mode, only the OTP
secretis encrypted; non-secret metadata (issuer,label,category,algorithm,digits,period,counter,imagePath) remains unencrypted to support listing, searching, category filtering, and HOTP counter updates. - Backups, exports, and single-token sharing:
- In None and App launch modes, JSON / Key URI exports and Android system backup (
allowBackup="true") store token secrets without app-layer encryption for cross-device and cross-app portability. - In Token encrypted mode, Android system backup stores encrypted token secrets (recoverable on a new device using the user's encryption key), and bulk JSON / Key URI exports let the user choose between encrypted (
freeotp-backup-encrypted_<datetime>.json/.txt) and decrypted files. - Single-token sharing (
Share QR CodeandShare to other apps) always outputs unencryptedotpauth://URIs after authentication so target services and authenticator apps can scan them. Users remain responsible for securing decrypted backup files and shared QR codes.
- In None and App launch modes, JSON / Key URI exports and Android system backup (
- Optional authentication and encryption: App-launch authentication and token secret encryption are opt-in in settings (
Noneis the default); secret reveal, token sharing, and exports require authentication whenever a system screen lock is configured (or encryption key verification in Token encrypted mode when no screen lock is configured).