Skip to content

fix(chat): A permission ask names its kind, not the question #678

Closed

Description

@omesser

Problem

A permission ask shows the tool call's kind and title and nothing else, so a request whose title is generic gives the user no way to know what they are approving.

Observed on macOS, 2026-09-14. The whole row reads:

BUDDY BOT · ASKS
other: Question from MCP server
[ Allow ] [ Always allow ] [ Deny ] [ Cancel ]

other is ToolKind::Other through name_of, and it is given top billing despite being the least informative thing available. "Question from MCP server" is the tool call's title. The question itself is never forwarded. The user is asked to Allow or Deny with the subject withheld.

This is the shape that trains people to click Allow, which makes it worse than a cosmetic gap: the consent gate is the one place the product asks the user to make a security decision, and it is the one place the copy says least.

Cause

permission_ask at src-tauri/src/acp_wire.rs:712-735 builds PermissionAsk from exactly two fields of the tool call:

title: request.tool_call.fields.title.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| "(untitled)".to_string()),
kind: request.tool_call.fields.kind.as_ref().map(name_of),

PermissionAsk (acp_wire.rs:88) therefore carries only request, title, kind, options. But agent-client-protocol 2.1's ToolCallUpdateFields also carries, all of which are dropped on the floor:

  • content: Option<Vec<ToolCallContent>> — where a question's text would be
  • raw_input: Option<serde_json::Value> — the arguments the tool was called with
  • locations: Option<Vec<ToolCallLocation>> — what it would touch
  • name: Option<String> — the programmatic tool name, which alone would say more than other

Then src/chat.js:208 renders what little survived:

body.textContent = ask.kind ? `${ask.kind}: ${ask.title}` : ask.title;

Expected

  • Show what is actually being asked. Prefer the tool call's content; fall back to raw_input when there is no content.
  • Do not lead with kind. other is noise; the tool name is not.
  • When a tool would touch a file or a path, say which — locations carries it.
  • An ask with genuinely nothing to show should say that plainly rather than printing (untitled) or a bare kind, so an empty ask is distinguishable from one whose detail was dropped.
  • A long or structured payload must not break the 420pt surface (ADR-0012), and raw_input is arbitrary JSON — it needs a bound and a readable shape, not a dump.

Worth deciding in the issue

raw_input is untrusted and arbitrary. It reaches the DOM through textContent today, which is safe; keep it that way, and note this interacts with #677 if a Markdown renderer lands on the same surface.

How to verify

Attach an MCP server that asks a question, or exercise the fake at src-tauri/src/harness.rs:1787, which already posts a synthetic session/request_permission and is the cheapest way to drive the row.

Related

Reporter still is in the originating chat; GitHub's attachment upload is a browser affordance no agent can reach, so drag the PNG onto this issue if a picture is wanted in-thread.

— Claude Code agent, on @omesser's behalf.

Activity

  1. added this to the V1 milestone on Sep 14, 2026
  2. added
    p0Drop everything: broken for users, or blocking
    on Sep 14, 2026
  3. moved this from 👷 Todo to 🏗 In Progress in Fidgeton Sep 14, 2026
  4. moved this from 🏗 In Progress to 🏁 Done in Fidgeton Sep 14, 2026
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Metadata

Metadata

Assignees

No one assigned

    Labels

    bugSomething isn't workingharnessp0Drop everything: broken for users, or blocking

    Projects

    • Status
      Done

    Milestone

    Relationships

    None yet

    Development

    No branches or pull requests

    Issue actions