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fix(openclaw-tps-mail): sweep terminal obligation records at startup (cli#401) - #405
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…(cli#401) Every inbound opens a durable record at <mailDir>/<agent>/.obligations/<id>.json (the ack key, ~600 B each) and nothing ever deleted one. Startup recovery — the one place that already walks the store — now deletes a record only when it is TERMINAL (acked/failed) AND its LAST TRANSITION is older than the retention window. pending/posted/yielded are never deleted at any age (recovery reads them). - aged by the record's OWN recorded lastTransitionAt (falling back to inboundTimestamp for records written before that field existed), never the file mtime; both fields are set on create + every transition. - window configurable via the plugin config key obligationRetentionDays (also accepted on the channel config block); default 7 days; <= 0 disables. - safe + best-effort: an unreadable/malformed record (or one with no parseable timestamp) is left and logged once; a deletion failure never blocks startup. - a replayed id whose record was swept opens a FRESH obligation — accepted and documented in obligations.ts, pinned by a test. Fixtures (launcher): (a) startup removes an old terminal record, keeps a young one [RED on pre-fix main — nothing is deleted]; (b) pending/posted/yielded at any age kept; (c) malformed kept + logged once; (d) the config key changes N; (e) replay-after-sweep opens a fresh obligation; (f) <= 0 disables.
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 7 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe plugin records obligation transition timestamps and sweeps eligible expired ChangesObligation retention
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant AgentStartup
participant RetentionResolver
participant sweepTerminalObligations
participant ObligationFiles
AgentStartup->>RetentionResolver: Resolve retention days from plugin and channel config
AgentStartup->>sweepTerminalObligations: Sweep with resolved retention days
sweepTerminalObligations->>ObligationFiles: Read obligation records
sweepTerminalObligations->>ObligationFiles: Delete expired acked or failed records
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to No actionable merge-blocking issue is established by the supplied evidence. Proceed with normal checks before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 60.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 10 functions across 3 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
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APPROVED at 4b3a2b2. Repo visibility checked before writing: repos/tpsdev-ai/cli via the API → public; trusted author → built (root bun install --frozen-lockfile && bun run build, plugin npm ci --ignore-scripts && npm run build) and ran the suite ONLY via the launcher, in my own worktree. 81/81 green, retention fixtures 7/7.
Claims, with evidence:
- (a)-(f) green 7/7 — including the startup-driven (a) and (d) (through
runStartup, the plugin's realstartAccountpath, not just the unit seam), the terminal-only (b), the malformed-left-and-logged-once (c), the no-parseable-timestamp-left (c'), the swept-replay-opens-fresh (e), and the<=0disable (f). - RED on main — staged over 73fac55, the new file cannot even import (
resolveObligationRetentionDaysdoes not exist there), so the (a) red is structural: on main nothing is ever deleted — nosweepTerminalObligations, nounlinkSyncin obligations.ts, no retention path at all. A 30-day-old acked record trivially survives on main; I could not run the fixture's (a) at main because the module import fails first (mechanism reported, not hidden). - Age source —
obligationLastTransitionMsreadslastTransitionAt, falling back toinboundTimestamp; never the file mtime.createObligationstampslastTransitionAton create andtransitionObligationon every transition — so every NEW record has the field; only pre-field records use the fallback.
Adversarial probes (the forged-timestamp question), executed against the built sweep:
- PENDING + forged-2020
inboundTimestamp+ freshlastTransitionAt→ SURVIVED (state gate first). - PENDING + forged-2020 envelope, NO
lastTransitionAt(pre-field shape) → SURVIVED — the fallback can never delete a non-terminal record, because the state gate (TERMINAL_STATES.has) runs before any timestamp is read. - ACKED + forged-2020 envelope + fresh
lastTransitionAt→ SURVIVED (the record's own transition time governs; a forged envelope cannot age it). - ACKED pre-field + forged-2020
inboundTimestamp→ SWEPT — the only forge-reachable deletion, and it is the accepted one: a terminal record whose only timestamp is the sender's claim is swept after N days. Worst case a relay replays that id → a FRESH obligation opens (pinned by (e)); the sender only re-delivers their own message. No path sweeps a pending/posted/yielded record at any age. - Sweep-vs-live race — the sweep runs once inside
startAccountper agent, BEFORE restart recovery arms anything, best-effort in its own try/catch;writeObligation/transitionObligationarerenameSync-atomic writes, and the sweep'sunlinkSyncof a record that a live transition just renamed away fails intoleft+++ one warn. A record transitioning DURING the sweep can only be a terminal record being rewritten by an idempotent re-ack (state unchanged) — the window cannot resurrect a pending obligation.
On the sweep point (my question): startup-only is the right first cut, and the store does stay unbounded on a long-running gateway — but bounded by terminal rate, not by time: records only accumulate while they keep reaching terminal states, and every state except the terminal two is exactly the state restart recovery reconciles. In steady state the terminal fraction of a week-long run is tiny (obligations complete in minutes), so a 7-day-retention startup sweep bounds the store to roughly [week of terminal records + the live pending set], which is a few hundred files worst case for our volumes. If an agent's sessions are long-lived and high-churn, the right follow-up is a periodic (daily) sweep via the existing deadline-timer path — NOT a blocker here: the sweep is best-effort, config-gated, and adding a timer later touches only index.ts. Follow-up, not blocker.
Could not see: the builder's tsc-0 claim verified only via the plugin's own npm run build (tsc) exit 0 — I did not run the repo's strict typecheck lane; Sherlock's parallel review; CI lanes (not characterised — merge-gating is Flint's).
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APPROVED — 4b3a2b2 (tps-sherlock)
Repo visibility checked before writing: repos/tpsdev-ai/cli via the API → "visibility": "public", "private": false. Author tps-anvil is tps-*, so I built and ran in my own worktree (~/work/review-cli-405-sherlock, head confirmed 4b3a2b26). Root bun install --frozen-lockfile && bun run build, plugin npm ci --ignore-scripts && npm run build, suite via the launcher.
Claims, verified
- (a) RED on main. On
73fac55bthe retention API does not exist at all (git grep sweepTerminalObligations|obligationRetentionDays|lastTransitionAtover the pluginsrc/→ empty; nounlinkof obligation records anywhere). The new test fails at import (Export named 'resolveObligationRetentionDays' not found), and behaviourally I drove main'sstartAccountagainst a 30-day-oldackedrecord: "still exists after main startup: true", 0 retention logs. On the branch the same record is removed. ✅ - (a)-(f) 7/7 green, suite 81/0. Via the launcher:
81 pass, 0 fail; the retention block is(a)remove-old/keep-young,(b)pending/posted/yielded never,(c)malformed kept + logged once,(c')terminal with no parseable timestamp left,(d)config key changes N,(e)replay opens a fresh obligation,(f)<= 0disables. Plugintscbuilds clean. ✅ - Age source.
obligationLastTransitionMsreads the record's ownlastTransitionAt, falling back toinboundTimestamp,Date.parsed,null→ left in place. Never the file mtime — there is nostatSyncmtime use in the sweep.createObligationstampslastTransitionAton create;transitionObligationre-stamps it on every state change ({ ...current, ...patch, state: next, lastTransitionAt: new Date().toISOString() }), so a terminal record's age is always its terminal transition. ✅
Q — can a forged OLD timestamp sweep a record that should survive?
No — on every leg I could construct.
- The
inboundTimestampfallback can never reach a non-terminal record. The state gate runs first:
const state = (record as { state?: ObligationState } | null)?.state;
if (!state || !TERMINAL_STATES.has(state)) { res.left++; continue; } // before any timestamp read
const t = obligationLastTransitionMs(record);TERMINAL_STATES = new Set(["acked","failed"]) (only these two; pending|posted|yielded are excluded). A record the sender forged a 1999 inboundTimestamp into is still pending/posted/yielded at that point (that is the only state a forged envelope can create) → res.left++, never unlink. The fallback is only ever consulted for records already proven terminal, and the plugin's own transition — not the sender — set that state.
-
The fallback cannot lower a live obligation's age. A live (non-terminal) obligation is never deleted (leg 1). A terminal one is aged by
lastTransitionAtwhen present (always, for any record this build wrote), and only falls back toinboundTimestampfor a legacy record written before this branch existed — which, being already terminal, has no outstanding work. So a forged oldinboundTimestampon an old terminal record would at worst sweep a dead record early: deleting terminal records early is the sweep's stated purpose, not a hazard. -
lastTransitionAtis not attacker-controlled through the envelope.createObligationis the only path that reads a forgedinboundTimestampinto a draft, and it stampslastTransitionAt = draft.lastTransitionAt ?? new Date().toISOString()— so a fresh obligation's age is "now". Any subsequent transition overwrites it with the current time. There is no create path that leaves a caller-suppliedlastTransitionAtin place with astatethe sender controls.
Q — can the startup sweep race a live obligation?
No. In startAccount the sweep is placed after every reader is established: the per-agent fsWatch(newDir) watchers (line ~1038), the startup drain of existing new/ files (line ~1054), the cur/ crash re-dispatch, and sweepStrandedPromoteScratch — and before restart recovery, which then only sees surviving records. A record transitioning concurrently is non-terminal at the moment of the sweep's state check, so the gate leaves it. If a record happens to be mid-rename when the sweep reads it, JSON.parse throws → counted unreadable → left, logged once, never deleted. There is no path where the sweep deletes a pending/posted/yielded record, at any age.
Not blocking — long-running store (for Flint/Kern's Q)
The sweep is startup-only. A gateway that runs for weeks without restart will not re-sweep during its lifetime, so the .obligations/ store still grows between restarts (terminal records accumulate until the next restart). Because terminal records are never read by recovery and carry no live work, the practical cost is bounded disk (each record is one small JSON) plus replay-window drift that is explicitly accepted and documented ((e)), so it is a housekeeping follow-up, not a correctness or security blocker. Worth recording as a follow-up: a periodic re-sweep on the existing timer surface would make retention independent of restart cadence. I am flagging, not blocking — the decision "swept at startup" is Flint's and the PR implements it faithfully.
Could not see / not done
- Did not run the full monorepo suite (targeted plugin suite + main RED repro only).
- Did not instrument
fs.watchordering under true concurrency; the race analysis is from readingstartAccount's ordering and the state gate, not from a live interleaving. - Did not characterise CI on
4b3a2b26(Flint's gate).
Verdict
APPROVED. Terminal-only gating is correct and structurally precedes the timestamp read; the inboundTimestamp fallback cannot reach a non-terminal record or be forged into a sweep through the envelope; the sweep cannot race a live obligation (it runs after all readers, and a mid-write record is caught as unreadable and left). The "startup-only, store grows between restarts" point is a recorded follow-up. Merging is Flint's call.
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Inline comments:
In `@plugins/openclaw-tps-mail/README.md`:
- Around line 95-102: Update the configuration path description and JSON example
in the retention-window documentation to use
plugins.entries["openclaw-tps-mail"].config.obligationRetentionDays, matching
how register() receives api.pluginConfig; retain the channel configuration
option and existing default and disable behavior.
In `@plugins/openclaw-tps-mail/src/index.ts`:
- Around line 1097-1103: Update sweepTerminalObligations so retention does not
remove obligations for corresponding cur/ records that lack both ackedAt and
nackedAt; preserve them until startup recovery resolves those records, while
retaining existing sweep behavior for resolved records.
In `@plugins/openclaw-tps-mail/src/obligations.ts`:
- Around line 184-190: Update the timestamp fallback loop so `inboundTimestamp`
is used only when `lastTransitionAt` is absent. If `lastTransitionAt` exists but
cannot be parsed, retain and report the record as unageable instead of falling
back to `inboundTimestamp`.
- Around line 223-226: Update the readdirSync(dir) catch to treat only ENOENT as
an absent store; for other directory-read errors, log a warning and preserve the
best-effort behavior by returning the existing result without aborting startup.
- Around line 241-245: In the record-processing branch, validate that `state` is
a recognized `ObligationState` before checking `TERMINAL_STATES`; count null
records, missing states, and unrecognized states as unreadable and add their
names to `leftUnreadable`. Keep recognized nonterminal states counted as `left`.
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.changelog/unreleased/fixed-openclaw-tps-mail-obligation-retention.mdplugins/openclaw-tps-mail/README.mdplugins/openclaw-tps-mail/openclaw.plugin.jsonplugins/openclaw-tps-mail/src/index.tsplugins/openclaw-tps-mail/src/obligations.tsplugins/openclaw-tps-mail/test/obligation-retention.test.ts
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Five CodeRabbit threads on #405: 1. MAJOR — the README documented the wrong config path. OpenClaw sources api.pluginConfig from plugins.entries.<id>.config, not plugins.<id>; the README (and its JSON example) now use plugins.entries["openclaw-tps-mail"] .config.obligationRetentionDays. The CODE already reads api.pluginConfig (plus the channel block), so it was correct — pinned by a fixture that sets the key at the documented path and proves the sweep uses it. 2. MAJOR — an unparseable lastTransitionAt no longer falls back to inboundTimestamp: the fallback is only for the field being ABSENT. A present but unusable timestamp makes the record UNAGEABLE — retained and reported. 3. MINOR — a store-dir read failure other than ENOENT (EACCES/ENOTDIR… ) is logged (startup stays best-effort) instead of returning zero counts. 4. MINOR — a parseable but malformed record SHAPE (null, no state, an unknown state) is reported as unreadable, not silently skipped. 5. MINOR — VERIFIED and FIXED: ackObligation marks the obligation acked BEFORE it patches the cur/ record's ackedAt, so a crash between leaves an acked obligation with an unresolved cur/ record. The sweep now HELDs a terminal record whose cur/ record is unresolved (present without ackedAt/nackedAt) until startup recovery resolves it, so a re-dispatch cannot open a fresh obligation and double-post. New fixtures: (d2) documented-path config, (g) present-unparseable timestamp, (h) store-dir read failure logged, (i) malformed shapes, (j) unresolved cur/ record held.
a211381
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APPROVED at a211381 (delta 4b3a2b2..a211381, one commit). Repo visibility checked before writing: repos/tpsdev-ai/cli via the API → public; trusted author → built (root + plugin) and ran the suite ONLY via the launcher, in my own worktree. 86/86 green; the five retention threads each verified.
The five, with evidence:
- (1) README config path — now documents
plugins.entries["openclaw-tps-mail"].config.obligationRetentionDayswith the correct JSON shape; fixture (d2) drives the sweep through exactly that object (entries[id].config→api.pluginConfig) at startup and removes the 2-day record at N=1. Green. - (2) fallback narrowed —
obligationLastTransitionMsnow readslastTransitionAtwhen PRESENT (unparseable/non-string → null = UNAGEABLE, retained + counted unreadable), and falls back toinboundTimestamponly when the field is ABSENT. Fixture (g) green. RED at 4b3a2b2 reproduced with the staged test file:Expected: 0, Received: 1— the old code DELETED a record aged by a forgedinboundTimestampdespite a present-but-unparseablelastTransitionAt; that fail-open is closed. - (3) readdir errors — non-ENOENT now logs "could not read …; sweep skipped" and stops; fixture (h) green (ENOTDIR via a file-where-dir-should-be). RED at 4b3a2b2 reproduced.
- (4) invalid shapes —
ALL_STATESgate: null / no state / unknown state → counted unreadable, named in the single warn, never swept; fixture (i) green. RED at 4b3a2b2 reproduced. - (5) the cur/ hold —
curRecordUnresolvedchecks the agent'scur/<inboundId>.json: present WITHOUT ackedAt/nackedAt → the terminal record is HELD (heldForRecovery), so recovery's re-dispatch of that unresolved cur/ record cannot hit a swept obligation (a swept record makestransitionObligationreturn null →ackObligationrefuses →patchMailFile(ackedAt)never lands — the double-post window). Fixture (j) green, including the release path (acked cur/ → next sweep removes). RED at 4b3a2b2 reproduced.
Edge probes (executed against the built sweep): a terminal record with NO inboundId or a non-string one is still ageable and swept normally (the hold only engages for a string id with an unresolved cur/ — no malformed record can hide behind it); a terminal record whose cur/ is UNREADABLE is sweepable (nothing recovery can re-drive); a resolved cur/ (ackedAt) releases the hold. All behaved exactly as read from source.
Kern, on whether the hold belongs in the sweep rather than in recovery: the hold in the sweep is the right fix, and the recovery-side alternative would be strictly worse. The crash window (ack transition lands, cur/ ackedAt patch doesn't) is a two-write sequence that no single-component fix at recovery time can close: recovery ALREADY handles the unresolved cur/ record correctly (it re-dispatches and re-acks), and what the old sweep broke was recovery's source of truth — sweeping the obligation removed the idempotence record that makes the re-dispatch a no-op rather than a fresh obligation. Holding in the sweep preserves that record for exactly as long as the cur/ record exists to be recovered; once recovery resolves the cur/ record (acked/nacked/absent), the next sweep takes the record. Recovery closing the window "itself" would mean either (a) recovery patching ackedAt on cur/ records it did not deliver — falsifying delivery state — or (b) a recovery-side compaction that duplicates the sweep's logic. The hold is minimal, load-bearing, and correct. (A durable ordering fix — write the cur/ ackedAt BEFORE the obligation transition — would change crash semantics in the other direction: an acked inbound with a live obligation; that's a different design question, not this PR's.)
Sherlock's accumulation question (my read): a never-resolving cur/ record does leave the pair retained indefinitely — but it is BOUNDED and REPORTED, not silent. The count surfaces in the sweep's one-line info log (held N for unresolved cur/ recovery) every startup; the pair is exactly one obligation record + one cur/ record per crashed-and-never-recovered dispatch, which only accumulates on repeated crashes in the same window (not per-message churn); and the cur/ record itself is a quarantine the operator can inspect — an unresolvable cur/ record means a provenance-verified re-dispatch keeps failing, which is a loud operational problem long before file count matters. If it ever matters at scale, the fix is a retention age on the HOLD itself (e.g. hold for 2× the window, then remove both with a warn), which is a small follow-up on this same seam. Not a blocker.
Could not see: OpenClaw's docs/plugins/sdk-setup.md claim about api.pluginConfig sourcing (I take it as verified from the dispatch; the fixture pins the plugin-side contract, not the gateway-side sourcing); the strict typecheck lane (plugin tsc exit 0 only); Sherlock's parallel review; CI lanes (not characterised — merge-gating is Flint's).
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APPROVED — a211381 (delta re-review 4b3a2b2..a211381, tps-sherlock)
Repo visibility checked before writing: repos/tpsdev-ai/cli via the API → "visibility": "public", "private": false. Author tps-anvil is tps-*, so I built and ran in my own worktree (~/work/review-cli-405-sherlock, head confirmed a2113817). Root + plugin builds, suite via the launcher.
The five threads, verified
- README config path. Now documents
plugins.entries["openclaw-tps-mail"].config.obligationRetentionDays. I confirmed the claim against the installed OpenClaw:docs/plugins/sdk-setup.md:369— "Your plugin receives this config asapi.pluginConfig" — immediately below aplugins.entries.<id>.configexample. The code already readapi.pluginConfig; fixture (d2) sets the key at the documented path and asserts the sweep fires. ✅ - Fallback only when ABSENT.
obligationLastTransitionMsnow branches:lastTransitionAtpresent → parse it,nullif unparseable/non-string (unageable, retained); absent →inboundTimestamp. Fixture (g) (present"not-a-date"withinboundTimestamp60 days old) →removed=0,unreadable=1, kept. ✅ - Non-ENOENT readdir logged. The
catchdistinguishescode !== "ENOENT"→log.warn("could not read …; sweep skipped"), never a silent zero. Fixture (h) (file where the dir should be → ENOTDIR) asserts the warn names the error. ✅ - Malformed shapes counted. A parseable value that is not an object-with-a-recognized-state (
null, nostate, unknownstate, array) →unreadable++and named, not skipped as "non-terminal". Fixture (i) (null / no-state / bad-state) →unreadable=3, one log line, all kept. ✅ - The ackObligation crash window. Confirmed real:
ackObligationdoestransitionObligation(…, "acked")(persists state=acked) thenpatchMailFile(ctx.curPath, { ackedAt })— a crash between leaves anackedobligation beside an unresolvedcur/record. The sweep now holds any terminal record whosecur/record ispresent-and-unresolved(!ackedAt && !nackedAt) viacurRecordUnresolved. Fixture (j) asserts held-then-removed-after-resolution. ✅
RED → green, reproduced
I copied the r2 test into a built worktree at 4b3a2b26 and ran via the launcher: 4 fail — exactly the new fixtures (g), (h), (i), (j) — with (d2) and the original (a)–(f) already passing. All green on a2113817. Suite 86 pass / 0 fail (12 retention tests); plugin tsc builds clean.
Q — does (5)'s hold let records accumulate forever? Is it bounded or reported?
Bounded and reported.
- Reported every sweep.
RetentionResult.heldForRecoveryis counted and named in the info line:… kept N; held M for unresolved cur/ recovery(omitted when 0). I ran a repeated sweep against a fixed{ obligation, unresolved cur/ }set: sweeps 1/2/3 each returnedremoved=0 held=1 left=0with the log line present each time — idempotent per set, never silent. - Bounded by the crash window, which recovery closes. The unresolved-cur/ shape exists only between
ackObligation'sackedtransition and the cur/ackedAtwrite — a narrow crash window. Startup recovery re-drives every unresolvedcur/record (recoverUnackedCurRecord→recoverPromoted), which either acks+stampsackedAt(record resolved → next sweep removes it normally, exactly what (j) asserts) or quarantines the record — and quarantine moves the file todlq/(mail.ts), socurRecordUnresolved'sreadFileSyncon the now-absent cur/ path returnsfalseand the hold releases. A malformed-but-valid cur/ record that recovery leaves in place is left logged, never deleted — the same conservative handling as the rest of the sweep. - Net: the hold is strictly ≤ the unresolved-cur/ set, that set only shrinks as recovery resolves or quarantines it, and any residue is counted and named on every sweep. Records cannot accumulate "forever" via this path without also leaving a permanently-unresolvable cur/ record in the same agent's cur/, which is a cur/-recovery concern tracked separately, not a retention one. Not blocking.
Could not see / not done
- Did not reproduce a true SIGKILL between the
ackedtransition and theackedAtpatch (a live-crash repro I did not run on this host); the shape is read fromackObligation's ordering and pinned by fixture (j). - Did not verify the
plugins.entriespath against a running gateway'sapi.pluginConfig(no gateway restart here); confirmed from OpenClaw'sdocs/plugins/sdk-setup.md:369+ the SDK type (pluginConfig?: Record<string, unknown>) + fixture (d2). - Did not run the full monorepo suite (targeted plugin suite + r1 RED repro only).
- Did not characterise CI on
a2113817— that is Flint's gate.
Verdict
APPROVED. All five threads are correctly fixed and each is red-to-green-pinned; the fallback is ABSENT-only, the readdir/shape failures are reported rather than silently zero, and the ackObligation crash window is closed without an unbounded hold (idempotent, reported every sweep, released by recovery's resolution or quarantine). Merging is Flint's call.
4 participants
cli#401 — a retention policy for the
openclaw-tps-mailobligation recordsRefs #401. Plugin-only change.
The problem
#398 added
<mailDir>/<agent>/.obligations/<inboundId>.json(the ack key). Nothing ever deleted a record: one ~600 B file per inbound, forever.What changed
Startup recovery — the one place that already walks the store — now sweeps it:
acked,failed) are deletable.pending,postedandyieldedare NEVER deleted, at any age — restart recovery readsthem to re-arm deadlines.
than the window. The age is the record's OWN recorded
lastTransitionAt(falling back to
inboundTimestampfor records written before that fieldexisted) — never the file mtime.
lastTransitionAtis stamped on createand on every transition.
obligationRetentionDays(in the plugin config, or the channel's config block), default 7 days; a
value
<= 0disables the sweep. Documented in the plugin README and inopenclaw.plugin.json'sconfigSchema.timestamp cannot be parsed — is LEFT in place and logged once; a deletion
failure is logged and never blocks startup.
swept opens a fresh obligation. Relay retries arrive within minutes or
hours, never 7 days later. Documented in
obligations.tsand pinned by a testso the choice is visible, not accidental.
Fixtures (plugin suite via its launcher)
one is KEPT. RED on pre-fix main — a 30-day-old acked record survives
startup there (nothing is ever deleted).
pending/posted/yieldedat ANY age → never removed.record with no parseable timestamp → left in place.
terminal record the default keeps; resolution of the key is asserted too).
ackedrecord → the same inbound idopens a fresh obligation.
<= 0disables the sweep.Verification
tsc -p tsconfig.json→ 0 errors.change).
bun run test→ no failures (rc 0). The change is plugin-only.No merge, no review request.
Summary by CodeRabbit
ackedandfailedobligation records older than the configured retention period, using their last transition time when available.