Repository navigation
Conversation
… race Windows Node has no O_NOFOLLOW or O_NONBLOCK, so readFileWithinLimit() in both validators rejected every input there. On win32 only, refuse device paths, reject a symlink or non-regular file by lstat, open the file, then require the open handle to have the same volume and file ID as the lstat result. A file swapped between the two calls is refused instead of read. Other platforms without the flags still fail closed. Fixes cloudflare#53 and cloudflare#117. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
coffeegrind123
added a commit
to coffeegrind123/security-audit-skill
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 11, 2026
Upstream main has not moved since 2026-09-14, but 79 pull requests are open. Each was read at the diff level, tested in its own worktree, and checked for conflicts; the best of each duplicate group is ported. Validators: cloudflare#143 archived verifier owner reuse, cloudflare#87 shared artifacts within one attempt, cloudflare#102/cloudflare#103 duplicate JSON keys, cloudflare#111 1,000-field objects, cloudflare#127 ordinary class must match assignment, cloudflare#104 self-excluded ordinary block, cloudflare#141 verbatim quotes checked with --target, cloudflare#45 line upper bound, cloudflare#84 --terminal rejects open units, cloudflare#145 identity-checked open on Windows (POSIX still fails closed), cloudflare#48 retained-artifact check (skills/ part only). Overlapping changes were merged so both behaviours and both test sets survive. Method: cloudflare#125 critic reasons through handoff, cloudflare#132 deployment controls become units, cloudflare#83 carried-record gates, cloudflare#93 abort cleanup, cloudflare#23 streaming tool calls, cloudflare#50 config-dependent reachability stays needs_validation, cloudflare#58 sequential verifier fallback, cloudflare#96 verifier no longer sees the hunter's verdict, severity or fix. Execution safety (cloudflare#76 neutralized git, symlink-safe copies; cloudflare#95 sanitized repo ID and prior-run compatibility; cloudflare#108 untrusted-content prompt block; cloudflare#129 isolation built beside the host) moves into EXECUTION-SAFETY.md so SKILL.md stays under its token budget. Companions: cloudflare#101 cryptography, cloudflare#116 Android, cloudflare#35 edge isolate state. Skipped: duplicates (cloudflare#82 cloudflare#106 cloudflare#91 cloudflare#70 cloudflare#138 cloudflare#131 cloudflare#75 cloudflare#63 cloudflare#97 cloudflare#123 cloudflare#25 cloudflare#26 cloudflare#16 cloudflare#40 cloudflare#42 cloudflare#142), validator-weakening fallbacks (cloudflare#59 cloudflare#113 cloudflare#99), README/LICENSE churn, rebrands, scope creep, and cloudflare#85 cloudflare#90 cloudflare#8 cloudflare#89 cloudflare#32. UPGRADE.md records this sync procedure. Co-authored-by: Rohankollabathula67 <rohankollabathula67@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: lab 1207 <hajarevaibhav527@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Rudy Celekli <rudy@gradiahq.com> Co-authored-by: Mohit Rawat <rawatmohit17906@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: MAHER AL-AQIL <18458259+maqalaqil@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: CodeInf <jiuqiaoy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: pucedoteth <119044801+pucedoteth@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Matt Van Horn <mvanhorn@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Pizo <pizofreude@proton.me> Co-authored-by: ZhiHe-ma <302089060+ZhiHe-ma@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: shivam <juyaljii610@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Dante <duanjl.china@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Francisco <francisco@theysay.me> Co-authored-by: Roman Dolgov <alter@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: bodapatisaikrishna <saikrishnabodapati@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: alvessh <117163985+alvessh@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: itinance <hhuebel@itinance.com> Co-authored-by: ChoYugyeong <cho4639@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Shaun Liebenberg <shaun@liebies.co.za> Co-authored-by: JAI <jai19kharb@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: ghostzeronz-coder <ghostzeronz-coder@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Aman Mohamed Ali <69119173+spidervirus@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Sandeep.dhami <sandeep84397@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: jastfan <duohello640@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Fixes #53 and #117.
Problem
Windows Node leaves
fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOWandO_NONBLOCKundefined, soreadFileWithinLimit()in both validators rejects every input there. On Windows the findings suite fails (46 pass, 7 fail, 12 skipped) and the CLI can't validate anything.#99 and #113 also fix this. Both check the path with
lstat, then open it. The review on #113 points out that a file can be swapped between those two calls, and asks that platforms without the flags keep failing closed until there's a race-safe approach. This PR tries to answer that review.Change
In both validators, and only when
process.platform === "win32":\.\and\?\device paths, so a named pipe can't block the open.lstatthe path. Refuse a symlink or anything that isn't a regular file.fstatthe open handle and require the same volume (dev) and file ID (ino, read as a bigint) as thelstatresult. A zero file ID is refused, since a volume that can't report one can't prove anything.If the file is swapped between steps 2 and 3, the IDs differ and the read fails with "input changed while it was being opened". Platforms that have the flags keep the existing path unchanged. Platforms that lack them and aren't Windows still throw the existing error, so nothing that fails closed today starts reading.
Tests: the symlink CLI tests are no longer skipped on Windows by the missing-flag check, and each suite gains a Windows-only test that a device path is refused without blocking.
Verification (Windows 11, Node 24.21.0)
node --test skills/security-audit/*.test.cjs: 63 pass, 0 fail, 4 skipped. Unpatched on the same machine: 46 pass, 7 fail, 12 skipped. The 4 skips are the two FIFO tests (no FIFOs on Windows) and the two symlink tests, which skip themselves because this machine doesn't allow creating symlinks (no Developer Mode or admin rights). So the symlink path wasn't exercised here, and a run with symlink rights would be useful.lstatand theopen(it wrapsfs.openSync), then called the exportedreadFileWithinLimit. With no swap it read the file. With the swap it refused with "input changed while it was being opened".hasFlagscheck.🤖 Generated with Claude Code