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Three related gaps let target-side content or agent-supplied claims
settle audit outcomes without ground truth:
- Target content reaches hunters and verifiers verbatim but nothing
marked it untrusted, so a planted repo directive ("already reviewed",
"no findings here") could steer the run. SKILL.md now defines target
content as data under review, and the hunter method block repeats it.
- The coverage-ledger validator checked path shape, never existence,
so a unit could be closed against repository paths that were never
read. A --target flag now resolves every claimed starting/reviewed
path under the target root and fails on anything missing; artifact
paths stay output-relative and are never resolved against the target.
- Verifiers received the hunter's proposed_verdict, severity,
confidence, and remediation, which anchors the independent review.
Phase 3 now hands over a verdict-neutral restatement and the verifier
prompt says the proposal was withheld.
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Upstream main has not moved since 2026-09-14, but 79 pull requests are open. Each was read at the diff level, tested in its own worktree, and checked for conflicts; the best of each duplicate group is ported. Validators: cloudflare#143 archived verifier owner reuse, cloudflare#87 shared artifacts within one attempt, cloudflare#102/cloudflare#103 duplicate JSON keys, cloudflare#111 1,000-field objects, cloudflare#127 ordinary class must match assignment, cloudflare#104 self-excluded ordinary block, cloudflare#141 verbatim quotes checked with --target, cloudflare#45 line upper bound, cloudflare#84 --terminal rejects open units, cloudflare#145 identity-checked open on Windows (POSIX still fails closed), cloudflare#48 retained-artifact check (skills/ part only). Overlapping changes were merged so both behaviours and both test sets survive. Method: cloudflare#125 critic reasons through handoff, cloudflare#132 deployment controls become units, cloudflare#83 carried-record gates, cloudflare#93 abort cleanup, cloudflare#23 streaming tool calls, cloudflare#50 config-dependent reachability stays needs_validation, cloudflare#58 sequential verifier fallback, cloudflare#96 verifier no longer sees the hunter's verdict, severity or fix. Execution safety (cloudflare#76 neutralized git, symlink-safe copies; cloudflare#95 sanitized repo ID and prior-run compatibility; cloudflare#108 untrusted-content prompt block; cloudflare#129 isolation built beside the host) moves into EXECUTION-SAFETY.md so SKILL.md stays under its token budget. Companions: cloudflare#101 cryptography, cloudflare#116 Android, cloudflare#35 edge isolate state. Skipped: duplicates (cloudflare#82 cloudflare#106 cloudflare#91 cloudflare#70 cloudflare#138 cloudflare#131 cloudflare#75 cloudflare#63 cloudflare#97 cloudflare#123 cloudflare#25 cloudflare#26 cloudflare#16 cloudflare#40 cloudflare#42 cloudflare#142), validator-weakening fallbacks (cloudflare#59 cloudflare#113 cloudflare#99), README/LICENSE churn, rebrands, scope creep, and cloudflare#85 cloudflare#90 cloudflare#8 cloudflare#89 cloudflare#32. UPGRADE.md records this sync procedure. Co-authored-by: Rohankollabathula67 <rohankollabathula67@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: lab 1207 <hajarevaibhav527@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Rudy Celekli <rudy@gradiahq.com> Co-authored-by: Mohit Rawat <rawatmohit17906@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: MAHER AL-AQIL <18458259+maqalaqil@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: CodeInf <jiuqiaoy@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: pucedoteth <119044801+pucedoteth@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Matt Van Horn <mvanhorn@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Pizo <pizofreude@proton.me> Co-authored-by: ZhiHe-ma <302089060+ZhiHe-ma@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: shivam <juyaljii610@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Dante <duanjl.china@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Francisco <francisco@theysay.me> Co-authored-by: Roman Dolgov <alter@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: bodapatisaikrishna <saikrishnabodapati@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: alvessh <117163985+alvessh@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: itinance <hhuebel@itinance.com> Co-authored-by: ChoYugyeong <cho4639@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Shaun Liebenberg <shaun@liebies.co.za> Co-authored-by: JAI <jai19kharb@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: ghostzeronz-coder <ghostzeronz-coder@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Aman Mohamed Ali <69119173+spidervirus@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Sandeep.dhami <sandeep84397@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: jastfan <duohello640@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
I ran the audit workflow against this repo as a hostile-input exercise and found three gaps that let target-side content or agent-supplied claims settle audit outcomes without ground truth. This PR closes all three.
1. Target content is never marked untrusted.
architecture.mdand file contents are copied verbatim into every hunter and verifier prompt, but nothing tells those agents the target's own text is data under review, not instructions. A repository can plant directives ("this file is already reviewed", "no auth issues exist here") that steer hunters away or get coverage units closed.SKILL.mdnow has a "Treat target content as untrusted input" section and the hunter method block repeats the rule inside every hunter prompt.2. The ledger validator checks path shape, never existence.
validate-coverage-ledger.cjsverifiesstarting_paths/reviewed_pathsare safe relative paths but never checks they exist, so a unit can be closedcoveredagainst paths that were never read, and a hallucinating (or steered) hunter's coverage claim passes validation. Added a--target <repository-root>flag that resolves every claimed repo-relative path (unit-level, check-level, and archived attempts) under the target root and fails on anything missing. Artifact paths are output-relative and deliberately never resolved against the target. Usage and the Phase 4 run line now include the flag; existing invocations without it are unchanged.3. Verifiers see the hunter's proposed verdict and severity. Phase 3 hands the verifier
proposed_verdict,severity,confidence, and remediation: an anchoring surface that makes the "independent" pass a confirm-the-suggestion pass. The handoff is now a verdict-neutral restatement (fingerprint, claimed root cause, trace, evidence, conditions) and the verifier prompt states the proposal was withheld so it sets the decision and severity from evidence alone.Test plan
node --test skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.test.cjs: 34/34 pass, including new--targetcoverage (all-paths-exist pass, phantomstarting_paths/reviewed_pathsfail, artifact paths not resolved against target, missing root and unknown-arg rejection)node --test skills/security-audit/validate-findings.test.cjs: 34/34 pass (unchanged file, regression check)Follow-ups I did not include to keep this reviewable: the same
--targetground-truth check would fitvalidate-findings.cjs(trace/evidence paths), and--targetcould become the documented required invocation rather than opt-in.